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ABSTRACT 
  Contemporary separation-of-powers theory and practice generally 
rely on two competing theories—formalism and functionalism—to 
frame and decide contested questions about the scope of each 
branch’s constitutional power and authority. In some areas, this 
dichotomy works reasonably well and possesses significant 
explanatory force. But the dichotomy’s utility is considerably less 
obvious in the context of the federal appointments process.  
  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in National Labor Relations 
Board v. Noel Canning crisply demonstrates the limitations of 
formalism and functionalism in resolving separation-of-powers 
questions that equally implicate text, structure, and historical practice. 
Moreover, Justice Breyer’s Noel Canning opinion deftly transcends 
the formalism–functionalism dichotomy even while relying on textual, 
structural, historical, and practical arguments drawn from both modes 
of separation-of-powers analysis. Noel Canning teaches that 
constitutional text, by itself, will not always yield clear or reliable 
answers to difficult separation-of-powers questions. The decision also 
highlights a serious shortcoming in formalist legal analysis: When the 
Constitution expressly vests conflicting powers in different branches—
as in the context of staffing the executive branch—purely formalist 
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analysis will not suffice. Simply put, the Framers not only separated 
powers; they also blended them. In many important areas, the 
constitutional text does not clearly specify where one branch’s 
authority ends and another’s begins.  
  A workable account of the federal appointments process requires 
careful consideration of structure and practice, of original intent and 
appointments conventions developed over time, and of the conflicting 
textual imperatives of the Senate’s advice-and-consent power and of 
the unitary executive (understood in light of the President’s Article II 
“take care” duty). In order to develop an effective separation-of-
powers jurisprudence, the federal courts must transcend the 
formalism–functionalism dichotomy in this important area of 
separation-of-powers theory and practice. More broadly, the 
shortcomings of the formalism–functionalism dichotomy in the 
context of appointments suggest the need to rethink the dichotomy 
more broadly as well. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few areas of separation-of-powers theory and practice present 
more analytical complexities than does the federal appointments 
process. Myriad reasons exist for this state of affairs, and it is 
relatively easy to sketch why this area of administrative law does not 
seem susceptible of an easy or linear analysis. Conflicting textual 
commands, variable historical practices, and larger policy 
considerations involving the legitimate prerogatives of both the 
President and the Senate make applying separation-of-powers 
doctrine to the federal appointments process a particularly difficult 
exercise.1 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in National Labor 
Relations Board v. Noel Canning2 confirms that the federal 
appointments process resists any easy or obvious separation-of-
powers analysis. Although, strictly speaking, Noel Canning involves 
only the recess-appointments power rather than the appointments 
process more generally,3 Justice Breyer’s majority opinion4 offers a 
 
 1. For a thoughtful and comprehensive discussion of the potential importance of relying 
on consistent historical practice over time to inform separation-of-powers analysis, see generally 
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012). 
 2. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
 3. See id. at 2556–57, 2576–77. 
 4. Nominally, Noel Canning was a unanimous decision: all nine members of the Supreme 
Court voted to uphold the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s holding that President 
Obama could not use the recess-appointments power to make the contested appointments to 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). See id. at 2556–57 (opining that the Senate was in 
session at the time of the contested recess appointments, and holding that “the President lacked 
the power to make the recess appointments here at issue”); id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(rejecting Justice Breyer’s reasoning in support of the outcome because it “transforms the 
recess-appointment power from a tool carefully designed to fill a narrow and specific need into 
a weapon to be wielded by future Presidents against future Senates,” and explaining that he, 
along with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, “concur[red] in the judgment 
only”). Justice Scalia read the Recess Appointments Clause far more narrowly than the 
majority; he would permit its use only to make intersession appointments for offices that 
became vacant while the Senate was in an intersession recess. See id. at 2592–93. Accordingly, 
Noel Canning actually reflects a narrow 5–4 division of the Justices on the substantive issues 
before the Court. Because Justice Scalia rejected virtually all of Justice Breyer’s specific 
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novel “third way” of navigating separation-of-powers questions when 
conflicting specific constitutional mandates make it impossible to 
advance one constitutional imperative without, at the same time, 
doing violence to another.5 The opinion relies on a pragmatic 
formalist methodology, and thus gives significant attention to the 
Constitution’s text, but it also relies on practice, history, and purpose 
to ascertain the scope and meaning of the Recess Appointments 
Clause.6 
Noel Canning provides an important window into the salience 
and viability of formalism and functionalism as analytical tools in the 
specific context of the appointments process. Consideration of Noel 
Canning will also demonstrate the shortcomings of formalism and 
functionalism more generally.7 
This Article explores the failure of traditional formalism and 
functionalism8 in the specific context of the federal appointments 
process. It argues that sensible results—results that give meaning and 
effect to all the structural and substantive provisions of the 
Constitution—can be achieved only if reviewing courts blend 
concerns and methodologies associated with both schools of thought. 
This is so because, in the context of appointments, the Constitution 
creates competing—and potentially conflicting—mandates. It 
 
reasoning in support of the Court’s ultimate conclusion, and because he and the other 
“concurring” members of the Court would impose significantly more-stringent limits on the 
President’s use of the recess-appointments power going forward, in this Article I will refer to 
Justice Breyer’s opinion as the “majority” opinion and to Justice Scalia’s nominally concurring 
opinion as the “dissent” or “dissenting opinion.” 
 5. See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1939, 1944–48 (2011). Professor Manning persuasively argues that reviewing courts should 
consider the Constitution’s level of generality when applying separation-of-powers doctrine. 
“Where the Constitution is specific,” he argues, “the Court should not permit Congress to adopt 
a contrary approach under the more general authority it possesses under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.” Id. at 1947–48. On the other hand, “where no specific clause speaks directly to 
the question at issue, interpreters must respect the document’s indeterminacy.” Id. at 1948; see 
infra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. But cf. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and 
the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 853, 857–58 (1990) (arguing that the nonspecific 
Vesting Clauses effect “a complete division of otherwise unallocated federal governmental 
authority” and that “[a]ny exercise of governmental power” must fall within the formal 
categories of legislative, executive, and judicial duties). 
 6. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2578 (observing that “as in all cases, we interpret the 
Constitution in light of its text, purposes, and ‘our whole experience’ as a Nation”); see also 
infra notes 82–117 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 148–85 and accompanying text. 
 8. For a discussion of formalism and functionalism and the importance of this dichotomy 
to separation-of-powers jurisprudence, see infra notes 52–65 and accompanying text. 
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requires Senate confirmation for the President’s appointees to 
principal offices within the executive branch,9 but it also requires the 
President to ensure the implementation and execution of federal 
law.10 In these circumstances, formalist textualism will not provide 
plausible answers because the Constitution’s text points in different 
directions.11 
The Framers embraced a system of checks and balances as much, 
if not more, than a system of strictly separated powers. Moreover, the 
Framers designed a system for federal appointments that presents a 
serious risk of failure during periods when one party controls the 
Senate and a different party controls the White House.12 In this 
specific context, the Framers did not separate powers, but instead 
blended them.13 Nor is this unique to appointments; in multiple 
instances, the Framers allocated a power or responsibility to one 
branch that overlaps—or even conflicts—with powers and 
responsibilities vested in another.14 
 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 11. See infra notes 145–65 and accompanying text. 
 12. See Manning, supra note 5, at 1983 (observing that “Article II carefully divides the 
traditionally executive power of appointment between the President and Congress”). One could 
posit, of course, that the Framers did not anticipate the emergence of political parties and 
partisan contests for Senate seats and the presidency. See generally Joshua D. Hawley, The 
Transformative Twelfth Amendment, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501 (2014) (arguing that the 
Electoral College and the method of selecting the President and Vice President in the original 
Constitution presumed that these would be nonpartisan offices). Even so, if a serious 
disagreement regarding policy arose between the President and a majority of the Senate, the 
Framers must have recognized that the Senate would hold the trump card—even if they 
anticipated that the Senate would vote on all presidential nominees, they surely also anticipated 
that some nominees might fail to receive the Senate’s approval. Thus, it is telling that the 
Framers did not provide the President with any alternative means of staffing principal offices 
within the executive branch. 
 13. This blending of powers seeks to achieve a “balance” rather than a “separation” of 
powers and functions; it reflects and incorporates the British constitutional tradition, which 
generally eschews separating powers in favor of balancing them. See Michael Skold, Note, The 
Reform Act’s Supreme Court: A Missed Opportunity for Judicial Review in the United 
Kingdom?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 2149, 2154 (2007); see also A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 3, 21–23, 88–89 (1885) (discussing the centrality of 
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy and its relationship to the concept of a balance, rather 
than a separation, of powers). 
 14. The war powers offer an instructive example. Article II provides that “[t]he President 
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of 
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 2, cl. 1. Article I, however, states that Congress holds the power “[t]o declare War, grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water” and 
to create and regulate the armed forces of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–14. 
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Moreover, the Framers used this technique to create contested 
zones of authority between the President and Congress without 
offering any textual guidance on how to resolve the inevitable 
conflicts that would arise from these overlapping powers.15 Indeed, 
strictly speaking, the Constitution does not even address the issue of 
who will resolve these questions in the event of an impasse between 
the President and Congress.16 A workable approach to enforcing the 
 
In this context, as with appointments, the Framers intentionally blended, rather than separated, 
the war powers. The Constitution simply does not provide a clear answer as to when the 
Commander-in-Chief’s power ends and Congress’s authority over declaring war and 
establishing the armed forces of the United States begins. For an instructive discussion, see 
LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 249–
72 (2007). Accordingly, the constitutional boundaries of these powers remain highly contested. 
See, e.g., The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012). The relevant legal 
scholarship also reflects the deep-seated nature of this dispute; some legal scholars argue that 
congressional authorization must be obtained before the President undertakes action that 
otherwise constitutes an act of war, whereas others argue with equal fervor that the President 
enjoys substantial authority to undertake military action without first seeking and obtaining 
permission from Congress. Compare JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3–5, 8–10 (1993) (advancing the 
congressionalist position, which posits Congress must authorize all offensive military 
operations), with JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 5–11, 99–100 (2005) (advancing the presidentialist position, 
which posits that the President has inherent authority as Commander-in-Chief to initiate 
offensive military operations). Thus, in most cases presenting war-powers questions, a federal 
judge cannot rely solely on the Constitution’s text, but must instead integrate text, history, 
practice, and conventions in order to fashion a persuasive opinion. In other words, only a 
blended approach will yield useful answers. See Manning, supra note 5, at 1972 (“New thinking 
about the legitimacy of strongly purposive reasoning reveals difficulties with the approach that 
underlies both strands of modern separation of powers doctrine.”); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, 
The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1138 (2000) (observing, 
in the context of separation-of-powers doctrine more generally, that “neither of the dominant 
approaches provides a consistent account of the methodology applied or the outcome of the 
cases”). 
 15. DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, THE ORIGINAL COMPROMISE: WHAT THE 
CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS WERE REALLY THINKING 233–36 (2013). 
 16. Of course, the obvious answer is that the federal courts must resolve such disputes; this 
approach also clearly comports with the intention of the Framers. In Federalist No. 78, 
Alexander Hamilton writes that “where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands 
in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be 
governed by the latter rather than the former.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 468 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Thus, “whenever a particular statute contravenes the 
Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the 
former.” Id. Given that the proponents of the Constitution clearly stated before ratification that 
the federal courts would enjoy the power of judicial review, it seems obvious that the federal 
judiciary must shoulder the unhappy task of serving as a referee in disputes between the 
President and Congress regarding the metes and bounds of their respective powers. See 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996, 1001 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that “the 
Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President 
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separation-of-powers doctrine must address the problems associated 
with blended, rather than separated, powers and responsibilities; Noel 
Canning could provide a sound roadmap to achieving this goal. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sketches how the 
Constitution’s text creates conflicting spheres of authority. It 
considers whether the federal courts are best positioned to resolve 
these conflicts; arguably conflicts of this sort might best be 
characterized as “political questions” and left to the President and 
Congress to sort out on their own.17 This Part also discusses and 
critiques the two dominant approaches to framing and enforcing 
separation-of-powers doctrine—formalism and functionalism.18 
Part II provides an overview of the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Noel Canning, with particular attention paid to the 
differences in interpretative methodology reflected in Justice Breyer’s 
majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s nominally concurring opinion. 
Part III then considers the failings of formalism in the context of 
disputes arising between the President and Congress in areas where 
the Constitution provides potentially conflicting textual mandates (as 
is the case with respect to the federal appointments process); it also 
examines the failings of functionalism where the Constitution’s text 
provides clear rules of the road.19 Parts II and III posit that an 
effective approach to framing the appointments process requires 
careful attention to both the Senate’s constitutional role in the 
appointments process and to the Framers’ conscious decision to 
create a unitary executive headed by a single national officer, the 
President.20 
 
and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse,” but also positing that 
“[t]he specter of the Federal Government brought to a halt because of the mutual intransigence 
of the President and Congress would require this Court to provide a resolution” after the 
political branches reach an impasse). 
 17. See Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–6, 17–19 
(2013) (arguing that the federal courts should not resolve disputes between Congress and the 
President involving the President’s power to remove principal and inferior officers serving in the 
executive branch); see also Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996–1001 (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing 
the circumstances in which the federal courts should abstain from deciding disputes between the 
President and Congress and the circumstances in which the federal courts have a duty to serve 
as a referee between the political branches). 
 18. See infra notes 52–65 and accompanying text. 
 19. Manning, supra note 5, at 1950–62 (discussing and describing formalism and 
functionalism, but suggesting that a textual approach that considers the specificity or generality 
of constitutional text would greatly improve the resolution of separation-of-powers questions). 
 20. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and 
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 596–97 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, The Place of 
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Part IV argues that the federal courts should use historical 
practice as a means of resolving otherwise irreconcilable 
constitutional assignments of responsibility. To be clear, I do not 
claim that historical practice, as a normative matter, constitutes the 
only, or even the best, potential tiebreaker. But when the 
Constitution itself does not provide clear answers to difficult 
separation-of-powers questions or, worse still, yields conflicting rules, 
a principled decision rooted in historical practice, convention, and 
policy presents the best way forward.21 
To the extent that judicial legitimacy rests on both the 
perception and underlying reality that federal judges make decisions 
based on rules derived from the Constitution itself, as opposed to 
their personal policy preferences,22 using historical practice to resolve 
separation-of-powers questions in areas where the Framers blended, 
rather than separated, constitutional responsibilities makes a great 
deal of sense. Accordingly, in the absence of a clear textual mandate 
that disallows a constitutional convention,23 the federal courts should 
rely on these conventions when engaging in separation-of-powers 
analysis; moreover, adoption of historical practice as a tiebreaker in 
cases involving conflicting responsibilities should be deployed not 
 
Agencies in Government] (arguing that the Constitution’s structural design clearly anticipates 
that the President will enjoy responsibility for the implementation of federal law, including 
major administrative programs, and positing that “[w]hatever arrangements are made, one must 
be able to characterize the President as the unitary, politically accountable head of all law-
administration, sufficiently potent in his own relationships with those who actually perform it to 
serve as an effective counter to a feared Congress”); see also Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: 
Overseer, or the “Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 
696 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer] (“All will agree that the Constitution creates a unitary 
chief executive officer, the President, at the head of the government Congress defines to do the 
work its statutes detail.”). 
 21. See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 
1165–68, 1181–88 (2013). 
 22. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 32 (1962). Of course, it bears noting that Professor Bickel once 
observed that “[t]he Court exists in the Lincolnian tension between principle and expediency.” 
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 40, 50 (1961). 
 23. The legislative veto provides an example of a circumstance in which the Constitution’s 
text provided a clear rule and no conflicting substantive or structural rule existed. See INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–59 (1983); see also Manning, supra note 5, at 1955–58 (discussing 
Chadha and rejecting Justice White’s functionalist analysis as failing to give sufficient weight to 
the express textual commands of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 with respect to the enactment of 
a bill into law). In such cases, the federal courts should not resort to past practice to validate an 
otherwise ultra vires action. See infra notes 209–31 and accompanying text. 
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only in cases involving the federal appointments process, but more 
generally as well. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FEDERAL  
APPOINTMENTS POWER 
This Part begins by examining in some detail the Constitution’s 
text regarding the federal appointments process. It then considers 
how the federal courts should go about resolving the constitutional 
conflicts that are inherent in the text of the Constitution itself. In 
circumstances in which the Framers created potentially conflicting 
textual commands, reviewing courts must embrace second-best 
solutions—solutions premised on extratextual means of analysis. 
More specifically, a reviewing court should place significant reliance 
on constitutional conventions and practice over time in order to 
resolve such constitutional conflicts. 
A. The Constitutional Text and Federal Appointments 
The Framers intentionally designed the federal appointments 
process as a shared power held jointly by the President and the 
Senate.24 Although the President alone enjoys the sole power to 
nominate principal and inferior executive officers, as well as Article 
III judges,25 the Framers conditioned this power of appointment on 
the Senate’s giving its advice and consent to the President’s 
nominations.26 Moreover, the Senate’s constitutional power of advice 
and consent does not force the Senate to vote on all presidential 
nominations subject to the Appointments Clause—or even to 
 
 24. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Jonathan Turley, Recess Appointments in the 
Age of Regulation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1523, 1533–37 (2013) (discussing in some detail the debates 
surrounding appointments at the Federal Convention and the Framers’ decision to vest 
appointments on a shared basis between the President and the Senate). Professor Jonathan 
Turley persuasively argues that the “apportionment between the executive and legislative 
branches was the dominant feature of the Framer’s [sic] design: the shared power that would 
encourage compromise and coordination between the branches.” Id. at 1532–33. 
 25. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 26. Jonathan Turley, Constitutional Adverse Possession: Recess Appointments and the Role 
of Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 965, 973 (describing the 
Framers’ decision to vest appointments jointly in the President and the Senate, and arguing that 
this process provides “a critical check and balance provision that the two branches must agree 
on who should sit on federal courts and in federal offices”). 
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consider them on the merits.27 Thus, the Framers blended 
responsibility for federal appointments, but failed to specify what 
would happen if the political branches became polarized, such that 
the Senate simply refused to consider the President’s nominations on 
a timely basis. 
Accordingly, the federal appointments process provides a poster-
child example of the problem of blended, rather than clearly 
separated, powers. The Constitution explicitly vests the Senate with a 
veto power over presidential appointments to senior executive-
branch posts and Article III federal judgeships;28 at the same time, 
however, the Constitution also requires the President to ensure the 
enforcement of federal laws.29 When the Senate refuses to confirm 
presidential nominees, invoking its power under the Appointments 
Clause, its action substantially burdens the President’s ability to 
discharge his responsibilities arising under the Take Care Clause.30 
The Opinions Clause31 and the structural decision to create a unitary 
 
 27. Other provisions of the Constitution, however, include time deadlines for action with 
default rules that apply after a specified time for action has expired. See infra notes 34–39 and 
accompanying text (discussing the so-called “pocket veto” provision of the Constitution). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 29. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President “shall take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing that the federal executive power 
“shall be vested in a President of the United States of America”); see also Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, The New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers 
Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government 
Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1625–29, 1640–45 (2012) (discussing the 
Constitution’s deliberate creation of a unitary executive and the consequences that must follow 
from this design regarding the President’s ability to oversee and control the enforcement of 
federal law). 
 30. See John C. Roberts, The Struggle over Executive Appointments, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 
725, 727 (arguing “that the long-term struggle between the President and the Senate over 
executive appointments has now reached a crisis and that we may be approaching a point where 
the President’s crucial duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed is significantly 
impaired”); id. at 750 (proposing that “specific steps . . . be taken to restore the proper balance 
between the President’s prerogative to staff his administration and take care that the laws are 
faithfully executed and the Senate’s rightful advice and consent role”). 
 31. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that the President “may require the 
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any 
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices”). It would be nonsensical to grant the 
President the right to demand opinions in writing from nonexistent subordinate officers. 
Although this fact does not mean that the Senate has a duty to vote on presidential 
nominations, it suggests that the Framers believed that Congress would create subordinate 
executive offices and that the Senate would agree to give its consent to presidential appointees 
to staff them. 
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executive headed by the President32 also demonstrate that the 
Constitution incorporates a strong assumption that the President will 
enjoy the assistance of loyal and reasonably responsive subordinate 
officers within the executive branch.33 
The Framers obviously understood that inaction could lead to 
gridlock. In other contexts, however, the Constitution contains 
provisions that include default rules meant to check inaction by one 
branch at the expense of another. The “pocket veto” provision of 
Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, provides an illustrative example.34 The 
President could, in theory, exercise a de facto veto by neither signing 
nor vetoing a particular bill—in the absence of a default rule, the 
President could simply toss the bill in a desk drawer and embark on 
an extended period of rumination about its merits and shortcomings. 
The Framers, however, anticipated this problem and provided a 
default rule that forces presidential action: if the President fails to 
sign or veto a bill within ten days—“Sundays excepted”35—it will 
become a law without his signature.36 But if Congress has adjourned, 
making it impossible to return a vetoed bill, “it shall not be a Law.”37 
 
 32. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 16, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that 
“[t]hose politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their 
principles and for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive,” and 
observing that “[t]hey have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary 
qualification (of the former) and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single 
hand”); see also Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, supra note 20, at 596–97, 649–50, 
660–64, 668–69 (arguing that the Constitution’s text and structure create a unitary executive and 
also mandate sufficient presidential control to ensure that that President is meaningfully 
accountable for all actions of the executive branch). 
 33. See Manning, supra note 5, at 2036 (“Since well-settled rules of implication suggest that 
the imposition of a duty implicitly connotes a grant of power minimally sufficient to see that 
duty fulfilled, the Take Care Clause seems straightforwardly to call for the recognition of 
sufficient ‘executive power’ to allow the President to remove subordinates who, in his or her 
view, are not faithfully implementing governing law.”). 
 34. One good way to ascertain constitutional meaning is to read various clauses in tandem, 
rather than in isolation; this “intratexualist” approach helps to resolve ambiguities by 
considering them in light of how the Framers approached similar problems in other contexts. 
See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 747–49 (1999). 
 35. See Jaynie Randall, Sundays Excepted, 59 ALA. L. REV. 507, 512 (2008) (discussing the 
Framers’ careful calibration of the President’s temporal window for considering bills that passed 
both houses of Congress). 
 36. Jaynie Randall explains that “the ten-day period reflects the Framer’s [sic] conception 
of a deliberative President, one who relied on advisors and collaborated with Congress in 
wielding his negative.” Id. at 510. The ten-day period, Sundays excepted, exceeded the period 
provided in contemporary state constitutions that vested the governor with a veto power. See id. 
at 510 n.16. 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
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Thus, Article I, Section 7, prevents the President from exercising a de 
facto veto through interminable delay. The Appointments Clause,38 
however, contains no comparable default rule requiring the Senate to 
act on presidential nominations; accordingly, the Senate is free to 
reject presidential nominations through inaction.39 
The Framers did provide a bypass provision for appointments 
subject to the Senate’s approval, but unlike the default rule governing 
presidential inaction on a bill, that provision does not provide a 
default rule declaring that inaction by the Senate constitutes consent 
to an appointment.40 The Recess Appointments Clause instead 
permits the President to make time-limited appointments without the 
Senate’s consent.41 The President may make such appointments only 
“during the Recess of the Senate,” and these appointments expire 
automatically at the end of the Senate’s next session.42 Thus, the 
Recess Appointments Clause, as written, constitutes an imperfect 
mechanism for bypassing an intransigent Senate’s refusal to consider 
a presidential nomination. 
Given the specificity of the Presentment Clause, however, in 
setting fixed time limits for presidential action on a bill that both 
houses of Congress have passed—and the corresponding lack of any 
temporal limits on the Senate’s consideration of presidential 
nominations that require the Senate’s approval in the Appointments 
Clause—one must conclude that the Framers intended to give the 
Senate an unreviewable veto power over presidential nominations 
through the expedient of simply not voting on a pending 
nomination.43 This intuitive judgment, premised on the Constitution’s 
 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 39. But cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers 
Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940, 946–49, 952–57 (2013) (arguing that 
the President may deem the Senate to have approved senior principal executive-branch 
nominations if the Senate fails to vote on such nominations on a timely basis). 
 40. Cf. id. at 946, 950–58 (observing that the Appointments Clause does not explicitly state 
that the President may not unilaterally deem Senate inaction a form of implied consent, and 
proposing that Senate inaction should constitute implied or de facto consent to presidential 
nominations of senior principal officers). 
 41. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all 
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which 
shall expire at the End of their next Session.”). 
 42. Id. 
 43. But cf. Roberts, supra note 30, at 725–28, 745, 750 (arguing that the federal courts 
should permit the President to use the Recess Appointments Clause to fill vacancies in the 
executive branch even when the Senate holds regular pro forma sessions). Professor Roberts 
objects that “if the Supreme Court were also to uphold the validity of the Senate’s pro forma 
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text, finds further confirmation in consistent practice over time: 
simply put, in over 225 years, no President has claimed that the 
Senate’s failure to vote on a particular nomination within a time 
certain constituted a form of de facto consent to the appointment. 
Nor, in the over 225 intervening years, has the Constitution been 
amended to provide the President with broader authority to bypass 
an intransigent Senate; if such a power were necessary to ensure the 
smooth functioning of the executive branch, it seems likely that an 
appropriate amendment would have been drafted, debated, and 
enacted.44 In fact, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment—a relatively recent 
amendment to the Constitution ratified in 1967—provides for a 
maximum twenty-one-day period during which the Vice President, 
with the support of a majority of the principal officers within the 
executive branch, may act as President over the President’s objection. 
If Congress fails to decide the issue within twenty-one days after 
being notified of the President’s alleged incapacity, the President is 
restored to office automatically.45 Thus, the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment provides clear default rules that require joint action by 
the Vice President, the cabinet, and Congress to remove a sitting 
President other than by impeachment. 
In sum, the Constitution and subsequent amendments provide 
for default rules in some cases, but not in others; impasses over 
presidential appointments fall into the latter category, not the former. 
That the Constitution does not require Senate action on presidential 
 
session in blocking the President’s appointment power . . . the recess appointments power could 
be extinguished altogether.” Id. at 745. Of course, the Supreme Court has done just that—and 
the Senate does now enjoy the ability to block recess appointments by making itself constantly 
available to receive and consider nominations. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 
134 S. Ct. 2550, 2555 (2014) (holding that “[f]or purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, 
the Senate is in session when it says that it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains the 
capacity to transact Senate business”); see also id. at 2573–77 (holding that the federal courts 
should defer to the Senate’s own determination of when it is in session, and hence available to 
receive and consider nominations, unless the Senate cannot undertake these duties despite 
being nominally in session). 
 44. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (providing for presidential succession on the death of the 
President, for appointment of a new Vice President with the advice and consent of both houses 
of Congress, and for the involuntary removal of the President under certain conditions).  
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment is a very odd 
constitutional duck. Section Four essentially provides a means of staging a constitutionally 
sanctioned coup d’état—provided that the Vice President can secure the support of a majority 
of the principal officers within the executive branch and two-thirds majorities of both houses of 
Congress. See id. The Amendment actually permits the Vice President to seize power for up to 
twenty-one days with the concurrence of a majority of the principal officers within the executive 
branch and without any action by Congress. Id. 
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nominations—much less action within a fixed time period—indicates 
that the Senate does not have a constitutional duty to act on such 
nominations. 
But this is not the end of the matter. Article II plainly 
presupposes that the President will enjoy the assistance of 
subordinates in “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed”46—subordinates from whom he can demand “Opinion[s], in 
writing.”47 In addition, specific powers delegated to the President 
cannot all be personally discharged by him, notably including control 
over foreign affairs and the military forces of the United States. 
The Framers, in blending responsibility for federal appointments, 
created the possibility of a constitutional impasse between the 
President and the Senate without providing a rule of decision for 
resolving such impasses. No amount of close reading of the 
Constitution’s text will resolve this problem; for constitutional 
conflicts of this sort, to advance one set of priorities is to do violence 
to another. 
B. Embracing the Second-Best Solution: Using Constitutional 
Practice to Resolve Conflicts Inherent in the Constitution’s Text 
As Professor Akhil Amar has astutely observed, “Good 
interpreters need to know when and how to read between the lines.”48 
Reading between the lines, however, will not resolve the problem of 
overlapping constitutional responsibilities vested in different 
branches. This Section argues that, when faced with conflicting 
textual commands, a reviewing court must accept that only second-
best solutions exist for resolving the conflict—the first and best (if 
elusive) solution being a clearly dictated textual resolution within the 
four corners of the Constitution itself.49 With respect to the inherent 
structural conflict that the Framers created in the context of the 
federal appointments process, considering how the President and 
Congress have actually operationalized the appointments process 
over time arguably constitutes the most promising second-best 
 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 48. Amar, supra note 34, at 827. 
 49. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 431 (“One need not be committed to a 
rigorous program of textualist originalism to agree that if the constitutional text clearly and 
straightforwardly answers a particular question, the burden of proof required to credit any 
argument for departing from that answer will—and should—be very heavy.”). 
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solution. The other alternatives, such as an open-ended cost-benefit 
analysis of the President’s need for a particular appointee versus the 
imperative of honoring the Senate’s role in the appointments 
process,50 seem far worse. 
Because the Constitution itself does not provide a bypass 
mechanism for presidential appointments,51 it is inevitable that 
disputes will arise between the President and the Senate over the 
Senate’s failure to consider and approve presidential nominees. The 
question then becomes: What kinds of self-help might the President 
be able to deploy? And what constitutional predicate—if any—could 
the President assert in support of such unilateral action? 
At this point, one’s general attitude toward the proper framing 
metrics for resolving separation-of-powers questions becomes acutely 
important. Two general approaches exist and find support in both the 
U.S. Reports and in major law reviews: formalism and functionalism.52  
Formalism generally relies on the Constitution’s allocation of 
particular powers and duties to create mandatory lines of 
demarcation that federal courts must strictly enforce: neither the 
reallocation of a power from one branch to another 
(aggrandizement), nor efforts to deny a power given to a particular 
branch without reallocating it (encroachment), should be tolerated.53 
Formalism relies on a kind of textualist analysis and places great 
 
 50. See Stephenson, supra note 39, at 946–58. For example, Professor Matthew Stephenson 
would limit his proposal for finding “tacit consent,” id. at 973, to appointments to senior 
principal offices, those which are “indispensible [sic] to carrying out the core programs and 
missions of the executive branch,” id. at 974, and enjoy significant policymaking authority; 
significantly, he would not permit the use of a legal fiction to appoint federal judges for 
“principally pragmatic” reasons, id. For further explanation of his proposal, see id. at 946, 973–
78. 
 51. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 52. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 608–09 (2001) (distinguishing between formalism and functionalism in 
the separation-of-powers context); Magill, supra note 14, at 1136–48 (same). For a general 
discussion of formalism and functionalism as competing theories for framing and deciding 
contested separation-of-powers questions, see Krotoszynski, supra note 29, at 1611–15. 
 53. Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is To Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When 
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 870–79 (2009) 
(discussing the salience of the concepts of encroachment and aggrandizement to both formalist 
and functionalist separation-of-powers analysis); Magill, supra note 52, at 626–33 (same); 
Manning, supra note 5, at 1944, 2021–22 (discussing formalism and the concept of interbranch 
encroachment). Dean Magill notes that “[t]he Supreme Court has frequently observed that the 
structural provisions of the Constitution are intended to prevent encroachment or 
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another.” Magill, supra note 52, at 627 n.66. 
KROTOSZYNSKI IN PRINTER FINAL (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2015  6:37 PM 
1528 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1513 
structural weight on the Vesting Clauses of Articles I, II, and III.54 In 
consequence, formalism tends to prioritize close textual readings of 
the Constitution over constitutional conventions developed through 
consistent practice over time.55 Moreover, strong formalists would 
permit recourse to historical practice only as a means of ascertaining 
the “original intent” of the Framers, and not as a means of 
supplementing or displacing that intent.56 
Functionalists, in contrast, tend to generalize the underlying 
purposes of specific constitutional assignments of powers to particular 
branches57 and then balance such textual commitments with a larger, 
and more pressing, commitment to creating an effective and efficient 
federal government.58 As Professor John Manning describes this 
approach, “functionalists view the Constitution as emphasizing the 
balance, and not the separation, of powers.”59 Dean Elizabeth Magill 
notes that the goal of functionalist analysis is “to achieve an 
appropriate balance of power among the three spheres of 
government.”60 
 
 54. Jellum, supra note 53, at 854, 861; see Lawson, supra note 5, at 859 (noting that 
“formalism is inextricably tied to both textualism and originalism”). 
 55. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550–54 (1994). As Calabresi and Prakash state the 
proposition, “First and foremost, in interpreting text, commonsensically enough, one ought to 
begin with the text.” Id. at 550. Moreover, “One should have recourse to history only where one 
could assert plausibly that an ambiguity exists.” Id. But in setting forth a hierarchy of 
interpretive resources, history and consistent practice appear at the very end of a four-point list 
because “[s]uch history is the least reliable source for recovering the original meaning of the 
law, but may in some instances help us recover the original understanding of an otherwise 
unfathomable and obscure text.” Id. at 553. The problem, of course, is that ascertaining meaning 
through recourse to legislative history is a notoriously difficult task—in many cases, even the 
proponents of a particular rule understood the rule differently. Moreover, this approach to 
constitutional interpretation ignores the fact that the Framers built deliberate ambiguity—
indeed, conflict—into the text. In light of this fact, the kind of originalism that Calabresi and 
Prakash advocate simply opens the door to naked exercises of judicial policymaking because of 
the absence of any real objective constraints rooted in neutral principles. Cf. Bradley & 
Morrison, supra note 1, at 414–15 (advocating a careful, context-sensitive analysis of historical 
practice to inform separation-of-powers doctrine in cases in which the Constitution itself does 
not yield clear answers to contested separation-of-powers questions). 
 56. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 55, at 550–53. 
 57. See Manning, supra note 5, at 1950 (noting that “[f]unctionalists believe that the 
Constitution’s structural clauses ultimately supply few useful details of meaning”). 
 58. Jellum, supra note 53, at 854–55. For an example of an iconic functionalist opinion, see 
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967–72, 983–87 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). Professor Manning 
argues that “Justice White’s dissent typifies modern functionalism,” Manning, supra note 5, at 
1956, and presents a “classic example of functionalist generality shifting,” id. at 1955.  
 59. Manning, supra note 5, at 1952. 
 60. Magill, supra note 14, at 1142–43. 
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To be sure, the specificity of a particular delegation and the 
centrality of a power to a particular branch are important 
considerations in a functionalist analysis of a novel administrative 
structure.61 A balancing exercise is almost always requisite, however, 
and to say that something must be taken into account is not to say 
that it must be given controlling weight in the analysis. Thus, for a 
functionalist, even radical departures from the Framers’ 
constitutional design might be justified under the right conditions. 
For example, a functionalist analysis might permit Congress to 
give the President alone the power to appoint principal officers within 
the executive branch in the event of a terrorist attack that causes mass 
casualties in Washington, D.C. For a formalist, on the other hand, 
exigent circumstances would almost never justify failing to satisfy the 
formal requirements of Article II, Section 2; even if compelling 
exigent circumstances existed, the President could not appoint 
principal officers without the advice and consent of the Senate.62 But 
when the Constitution expresses conflicting textual commitments, a 
reviewing court may not legitimately choose which constitutional 
command it will observe and enforce; the court has a duty to take all 
relevant provisions into account. In considering such questions, it 
seems both practical and quite logical to consider how the political 
branches themselves have gone about operationalizing the textually 
conflicting constitutional provisions. 
 
 61. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693–97 (1988) (rejecting a separation-of-
powers challenge to the appointment of an independent counsel because the powers of this 
office were sufficiently limited in scope to survive a functionalist balancing analysis, and holding 
that the independent-counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act gave “the Executive 
Branch sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the President [wa]s able 
to perform his constitutionally assigned duties”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–57 (1986) (upholding an assignment of certain common-law 
counterclaims to an administrative agency because the assignment did not implicate a core 
function of the Article III courts and therefore did “not contravene separation of powers 
principles or Article III”); cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As I have said, 
however, it is ultimately irrelevant how much the statute reduces Presidential control. The case 
is over when the Court acknowledges, as it must, that ‘[i]t is undeniable that the Act reduces the 
amount of control or supervision that the Attorney General and, through him, the President 
exercises over the investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal activity.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 62. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
1513, 1523–24 (1991) (noting that “[t]hose who espouse the formalist view of separated powers 
seek judicial legitimacy by insisting upon a firm textual basis in the Constitution for any 
governmental act,” and observing that “formalists attempt to ensure that exercise of 
governmental power comports strictly with the original blueprint laid down in articles I, II, and 
III of the Constitution”). 
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Thus, even if consistent practice by the President and Congress 
does not formally bind a reviewing court, some measure of deference 
would seem requisite if the resolution presents a workable and 
reasonable solution to the problem. This is not to say that the federal 
courts can shirk their constitutional obligation to “say what the law 
is,”63 but rather to say that in the absence of a clear outcome rooted in 
the Constitution’s text, practice represents the most logical—and least 
subjective—next-best source of meaning. 
Judges must not craft a set of constitutional conventions 
governing the appointments process from whole cloth.64 But when the 
Constitution points in radically different directions—and fails to 
harmonize conflicting priorities—using historical practice as a kind of 
“tiebreaker” reduces, rather than enhances, the problem of judicial 
discretion. This approach also alleviates the risk of judicial 
overreaching (which would arise if judges were to construe the 
separation of powers ahistorically and without regard to 
constitutional conventions).65 
II.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF NOEL CANNING AND ITS LANDMARK 
GLOSS ON THE RECESS APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
Before proceeding to consider Noel Canning’s implications for 
separation-of-powers theory and practice, some consideration of the 
decision’s facts and holding is requisite. This Part considers the 
factual background of Noel Canning, the dueling opinions authored 
by Justices Breyer and Scalia, and how and why both these opinions 
generally reflect formalist (rather than functionalist) methodology 
and reasoning. 
 
 63. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 
supra note 16, at 466–67 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that courts must decline to apply and 
enforce laws that violate the Constitution because “[l]imitations of this kind can be preserved in 
practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to 
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void”). Hamilton argues that 
in the absence of a federal judiciary vested with the power of judicial review, “all the 
[Constitution’s] reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” Id. at 
466. 
 64. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., John S. Stone Chair Inaugural Lecture: A Man for All 
Seasons: Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. and the Quest To Secure the Rule of Law, 61 ALA. L. REV. 
165, 184 (2009) (arguing that “the imprecision that exists in interpreting constitutional text is not 
a license for simply writing one’s own personal morality into the document”). 
 65. See Vermeule, supra note 21, at 1166–68, 1181–86 (discussing the development and 
importance of conventions in creating and maintaining governmental structures and practices). 
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A. The Factual Background and Lower-Court Holding in  
Noel Canning 
The facts at issue in Noel Canning are straightforward. After 
having active nominations to the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) pending before the Senate for over a year, on January 4, 
2012, President Obama invoked his power to appoint principal 
officers of the United States during periods when the Senate is in 
recess66 and purported to recess-appoint three new members to the 
NLRB.67 The Senate had, in fact, met in “pro forma” sessions on 
January 3 and January 6, 2012;68 if these sessions counted as bona fide 
meetings of the Senate, then the Senate had been in recess for less 
than twenty-four hours at the time the President purported to recess-
appoint the new NLRB members.69 
The Obama Administration took the legal position that it could 
simply disregard the Senate’s pro forma sessions; the President 
determined that the Senate had recessed on December 17, 2011, and 
would not reconvene to take up ordinary business until January 23, 
2012 (a recess of almost one month).70 Thus, according to the 
administration’s math, the Senate had been in recess for seventeen 
days when the President invoked his recess-appointments power. 
In support of its decision to disregard the Senate’s pro forma 
sessions, the administration relied on an opinion offered by Assistant 
Attorney General Virginia A. Seitz, who headed the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice.71 OLC took the position 
that because the Senate itself claimed that there would be “no 
 
 66. The Recess Appointments Clause provides that “[t]he President shall have Power to fill 
up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions 
which shall expire at the End of their next Session.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 67. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557 (2014). 
 68. Id. (emphasis removed). The Senate first adopted the practice of holding pro forma 
sessions in 2007, in order to block Republican President George W. Bush from using recess 
appointments to staff vacant executive and judicial offices. Roberts, supra note 30, at 747 (“Pro 
forma recesses to prevent recess appointments were first used in 2007 by the Democratic 
majority in the Senate to block recess appointments by President Bush, and the tactic was 
successful in that it deterred the President from attempting recess appointments.”); Carl Hulse, 
Loneliest Man in Town? He’s on the Senate Floor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, at A16. 
 69. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557. 
 70. Id.; see also Bryan J. Leitch, NLRB v. Noel Canning: The Separation-of-Powers 
Dialogue Continues, 2014 CATO S. CT. REV. 221, 223–26, 242 (2014) (providing a comprehensive 
factual background to Noel Canning and the Senate’s use of pro forma sessions to block recess 
appointments). 
 71. See Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate 
Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2012). 
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business conducted” during these pro forma sessions, the President 
could simply ignore them72—even though the Senate had in fact 
conducted regular legislative business during the pro forma sessions.73 
Professor Jonathan Turley strongly criticizes the administration’s 
constitutional logic, arguing that OLC’s “position erases any real 
consideration of duration [of a recess] from the calculus.”74 Turley 
posits that this approach “effectively say[s] that the President decides 
what a session is for the purposes of the Clause,” and that the 
President may ignore pro forma sessions because “these are not 
sessions to the satisfaction of the President.”75 
In consequence of the President’s bold action, the subsequent 
actions of the NLRB were subject to attack on the theory that the 
agency lacked a quorum if one disregarded the NLRB’s improperly 
appointed members.76 This was precisely the ground on which Noel 
Canning sought to fend off labor union charges that it had unlawfully 
failed to engage in collective bargaining with its employee union.77 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
agreed with Noel Canning’s position that President Obama’s recess 
appointments were legally invalid.78 It reasoned that because the 
NLRB seats became vacant during a period when the Senate was in 
session, the President could not fill the vacancies through recess 
appointments.79 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and 
 
 72. See id. at 19–21. 
 73. See Leitch, supra note 70, at 223–25. 
 74. Turley, supra note 26, at 994. 
 75. Id. at 991. 
 76. The Supreme Court, in an earlier opinion, had held that the NLRB must have at least 
three members in order to transact business. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., 560 U.S. 674, 679–82, 687–88 (2010). Writing for the New Process Steel majority, 
Justice Stevens explained that “[i]f Congress had intended to authorize two members alone to 
act for the Board on an ongoing basis, it could have said so in straightforward language.” Id. at 
681. Accordingly, “the Board quorum requirement and the three-member delegation clause 
should not be read as easily surmounted technical obstacles of little or no import.” Id. at 687–88. 
 77. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557 (2014) (“The 
[NLRB] found that a Pepsi-Cola distributor, Noel Canning, had unlawfully refused to reduce to 
writing and execute a collective-bargaining agreement with a labor union.”). 
 78. See Noel Canning v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 705 F.3d 490, 507–12 (D.C. Cir. 2013), 
aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (holding that the recess appointments were invalid). 
 79. See id. at 514 (“Even if the ‘End’ of the session were ‘during the Recess,’ . . . we hold 
that the appointment to that seat is invalid because the President must make the recess 
appointment during the same intersession recess when the vacancy for that office arose.”). 
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voted 9–0 to affirm the D.C. Circuit’s resolution of the case80—but not 
its reasoning. The Justices divided 5–4 on how broadly to construe the 
scope of the Recess Appointments Clause.81 
B. Justice Breyer’s Pragmatic Formalism 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion set out to answer three 
questions. First, may the President make recess appointments during 
an adjournment within a session of the Senate, or as the D.C. Circuit 
held, only during an intersession recess after the Senate adjourns sine 
die?82 Second, may the President use the recess-appointments power 
to fill offices that become vacant during a session of the Senate (that 
is, what do the words “may happen” mean)?83 Third, and finally, if 
intrasession recess appointments are constitutional, what is the 
minimum period of recess required for the Clause to apply, and 
relatedly, does the Senate or the President determine when the 
Senate is in session?84 Methodologically, Justice Breyer placed 
significant reliance on text, history, and practice; no one factor enjoys 
controlling weight.85 
 
 80. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2578 (holding that the Recess Appointments Clause did 
not empower the President to make the relevant appointments); see also id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (agreeing).  
 81. Compare infra notes 82–117 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion’s 
analysis), with notes 118–37 and accompanying text (discussing the concurring opinion’s 
analysis).  
 82. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J., majority opinion) (“Does [‘recess of 
the Senate’] refer only to an inter-session recess (i.e., a break between formal sessions of 
Congress), or does it also include an intra-session recess, such as a summer recess in the midst of 
a session?”).  
 83. See id. (“Does [‘vacancies that may happen’] refer only to vacancies that first come into 
existence during a recess, or does it also include vacancies that arise prior to a recess but 
continue to exist during the recess?”).  
 84. See id. at 2557 (“In calculating the length of a recess, are we to ignore the pro forma 
sessions, thereby treating the series of brief recesses as a single, month-long recess?”); see also 
Leitch, supra note 70, at 227–28 (discussing the cert. phase of Noel Canning in some detail and 
noting that although the Obama Administration “sought review of only two questions,” Noel 
Canning succeeded in adding a critical third question—namely, “Whether the President’s 
recess-appointment power may be exercised when the Senate is convening every three days in 
pro forma sessions,” even though the D.C. Circuit “had not addressed that issue”). The 
Supreme Court granted review of the question regarding the effect of the Senate’s pro forma 
sessions over the Obama Administration’s objections. Id. at 228. This question proved to be 
outcome-determinative. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2574–78. 
 85. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2558–59 (noting that the Recess Appointments Clause 
“reflects the tension between, on the one hand, the President’s continuous need for ‘the 
assistance of subordinates’ and, on the other, the Senate’s practice, particularly during the 
Republic’s early years, of meeting for a single brief session each year” (citation omitted)); id. at 
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Justice Breyer opined that the President may make recess 
appointments during intrasession breaks and not only during 
intersession breaks. He explained that “[i]n our view, the phrase ‘the 
recess’ includes an intrasession recess of substantial length.”86 After 
analyzing “[f]ounding-era dictionaries,”87 common usage of the term 
“recess” in the early years of the federal government,88 and historical 
practice over time,89 the majority found that the “constitutional text 
is . . . ambiguous”90 and concluded that the better approach reads “the 
Recess”91 as applicable to “both intra-session and inter-session 
recesses.”92 
Justice Breyer then considered what, if any, limits apply to 
making intrasession recess appointments. Using an intratextual mode 
of analysis,93 he concluded that “a recess of more than 3 days but less 
than 10 days is presumptively too short to fall within the Clause.”94 He 
derived the three-day lower limit from the Constitution’s requirement 
that the Senate obtain the consent of the House if it wishes to recess 
for more than three days during a session.95 This approach makes 
sense: a recess too brief to require the consent of the other chamber 
does not constitute a sufficient interruption of the Senate’s ability to 
receive and consider nominations to permit the President to invoke 
the recess-appointments power.96 The ten-day minimum period 
 
2559 (arguing that it is appropriate to “put significant weight upon historical practice” in setting 
the metes and bounds of the President’s recess-appointments power). 
 86. Id. at 2561. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 2561–62. 
 89. Id. at 2562–65. 
 90. Id. at 2561.  
 91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 92. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2561–62, 2567. 
 93. See Amar, supra note 34, at 791–95 (discussing various types of intratextual approaches 
to interpreting constitutional text). 
 94. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567. 
 95. See id. at 2566–67 (concluding that a Senate recess that is short enough to avoid the 
consent of the House does not trigger the Recess Appointments Clause); see also U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of 
the other, adjourn for more than three days.”). 
 96. But see Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2599 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Fumbling for some 
textually grounded standard, the majority seizes on the Adjournments Clause, which bars either 
House from adjourning for more than three days without the other’s consent.”). Justice Scalia 
rejects an intratextual reading of the Recess Appointments and Adjournments Clauses, arguing 
that “the dramatically different contexts in which the two clauses operate make importing the 3-
day limit from the Adjournments Clause into the Recess Appointments Clause ‘both arbitrary 
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derives from the practice of past presidents; with very few exceptions, 
presidents have not made recess appointments during breaks of less 
than ten days.97 
Significantly, the majority’s bright-line rule of a minimum ten-
day recess would seem to apply to both intrasession and intersession 
breaks: “If a Senate recess is so short that it does not require the 
consent of the House, it is too short to trigger the Recess 
Appointments Clause,” and “a recess lasting less than 10 days is 
presumptively too short as well.”98 
With respect to the second question—whether a vacancy must 
arise during a recess of the Senate—Justice Breyer concluded that 
both the broader purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause and 
the imperatives of Article II would be better served through a 
broader interpretation of the phrase “may happen.”99 As he 
explained, the Recess Appointments Clause exists “to permit the 
President to obtain the assistance of subordinate officers when the 
Senate, due to its recess, cannot confirm them.”100 To restrict the 
Clause only to vacancies that come into existence during a recess of 
the Senate “would prevent the President from making any recess 
appointment that arose before a recess, no matter who the official, no 
matter how dire the need, no matter how uncontroversial the 
appointment, and no matter how late in the last session the office fell 
vacant.”101 Ensuring the “President’s control and political 
accountability” requires that he have the ability to rely on persons of 
his own choosing, rather than career service personnel designated to 
 
and mistaken.’” Id. (quoting Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess 
Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1556 (2005)).  
 97. See id. at 2567 (majority opinion). The majority acknowledged that a very small 
number of counterexamples exist, but explained that “when considered against 200 years of 
settled practice, we regard these few scattered examples as anomalies.” Id. 
 98. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Breyer did not draw any distinction between an 
intersession recess and an intrasession recess of less than ten days’ duration; in either case, the 
recess-appointment power would be unavailable to the President. Justice Scalia, on the other 
hand, would permit only intersession recess appointments, but would permit them “even during 
very short inter-session breaks.” Id. at 2599 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring). In this particular, then, 
Justice Scalia’s approach actually offers the President broader authority to circumvent the 
Senate’s role in the appointments process than does the majority’s approach.  
 99. See id. at 2567–68 (majority opinion) (concluding that the Recess Appointments Clause 
applies both to vacancies that arise before a recess and those that remain during the recess). 
 100. Id. at 2568. 
 101. Id. at 2569–70. 
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serve in an acting capacity.102 Indeed, the majority invoked Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board103 in 
support of the proposition that the President must retain sufficient 
control and oversight over executive functions in order to be deemed 
politically accountable for their operation.104 
To be sure, Justice Breyer acknowledged that broadly construing 
the Recess Appointments Clause to reach intrasession breaks and 
offices that have long been vacant creates some tension with the 
Senate’s advice-and-consent power.105 But in reconciling the Senate’s 
advice-and-consent power with the President’s obligations under the 
Take Care Clause and the structural implications of a unitary 
executive headed by a single officer—namely, the President—Justice 
Breyer avoided empowering the Senate to cripple the executive 
branch; he instead sought an appropriate accommodation, or balance, 
between considerations that point in opposite directions.106 
Moreover, Justice Breyer did not embrace an abstract cost-
benefit analysis to reach these conclusions; his analysis relied first and 
foremost on constitutional text. Only after carefully considering 
whether the text has a clear and unambiguous meaning (it did not 
with respect to the phrases “the Recess” and “may happen”) and the 
conflicting textual mandates in Article II’s Recess Appointments and 
Take Care Clauses, as well as the overall structural imperative of the 
unitary executive, did Justice Breyer look to historical practice.107 As 
 
 102. Id. at 2569 (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 497–98 (2010)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (2012) (providing for the appointment of “[a]cting 
officer[s]” to discharge some of the duties vested in an office subject to the Senate’s advice and 
consent for appointments). 
 103. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 104. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2569 (discussing the implications of limiting “the 
President’s control and political accountability”); see also Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 497–98 
(describing the decline in accountability that results from restricting presidential oversight 
powers). 
 105. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2569 (recognizing that interpreting the Recess 
Appointments Clause broadly may “permit a President to avoid Senate confirmations as a 
matter of course”).  
 106. See id. at 2577–78 (assuaging fears that the Court’s holding significantly amended the 
constitutional balance between the branches of government); see also Leitch, supra note 70, at 
251 (positing that Justice Breyer’s opinion was not merely about “achieving a workable 
government or ensuring that each branch [is] able to perform its essential functions” but instead 
“about the authority of each branch to define its own institutional identity”). 
 107. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2561–63, 2567–70 (considering historical practice and 
conventions only after determining that the text itself was ambiguous and susceptible of more 
than one plausible interpretation); cf. id. at 2574 (finding that the Constitution’s text clearly and 
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one commentator has observed, “In seamlessly blending these 
functionalist and formalist rationales, Justice Breyer’s opinion 
challenges the integrity of the distinction.”108 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, in answering the third 
question, Justice Breyer concluded that the Senate, not the President, 
may determine when it is in session.109 He explained that the 
Constitution “gives the Senate wide latitude to determine whether 
and when to have a session, as well as how to conduct the session.”110 
Accordingly, “the Senate’s determination about what constitutes a 
session should merit great respect.”111 The conclusion necessarily 
follows, then, that “the Senate is in session when it says it is, provided 
that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate 
business.”112 
This portion of the opinion places strong weight on Article I, 
Section 5, Clause 2, which states that each house may “determine the 
Rules of its Proceedings.”113 The Constitution also vests the Senate 
with considerable discretion to control its own schedule.114 Because 
the Senate may both receive and consider nominations during its pro 
forma sessions, and has in fact conducted major legislative business 
during such meetings, the Senate’s position that it was not in recess 
for more than three-day periods in late 2011 and early 2012 was given 
determinative weight.115 In the absence of a recess of more than ten 
days, then, the President could not constitutionally make the 
contested recess appointments to the NLRB.116 This aspect of the 
majority’s decision effectively vests the Senate with the ability to 
 
unambiguously vests the Senate with the power to determine its own schedule and operating 
rules and, accordingly, declining to consider historical practice and conventions). 
 108. Leitch, supra note 70, at 242; see EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: 
RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 12 (2005) (arguing that outdated 
analytical constructs must be abandoned or updated to fit new circumstances in order to ensure 
that administrative law effectively addresses contemporary problems and issues). 
 109. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2573–77 (holding that “the Senate is in session when it 
says it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate business”). 
 110. Id. at 2574. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 114. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (empowering each house of Congress to adjourn).  
 115. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2574–76 (concluding that “the Senate’s determination 
about what constitutes a session should merit great respect”). 
 116. Id. at 2573–77. 
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block recess appointments by remaining open for business (even if it 
does so through so-called pro forma sessions).117 
C. Justice Scalia’s Textualism Masquerading as Formalism 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Thomas and Alito, would have affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s highly 
circumscribed reading of the Recess Appointments Clause. He would 
have reached this outcome by limiting the Clause to only intersession 
recesses (of whatever length)118 and by permitting such appointments 
only for vacancies that come into existence during the Senate’s 
intersession recess.119 So construed, the Clause would be effectively 
meaningless—unless, of course, the President sought to time 
resignations to take effect during intersession recesses and made 
appointments a nanosecond after accepting the carefully timed 
resignation. 
In Justice Scalia’s view, the words “recess” and “may happen” 
are not ambiguous but have clear, discernable meanings. He 
specifically rejected the majority’s textual analysis of the phrase “may 
happen” as “awkward and unnatural,”120 and argued that “it is clear 
that the Constitution authorizes the President to fill unilaterally only 
those vacancies that arise during a recess, not every vacancy that 
happens to exist during a recess.”121 Justice Scalia accused the 
majority of manufacturing ambiguity in the constitutional text when 
none existed. He wryly observed that “[w]hat the majority needs to 
sustain its judgment is an ambiguous text and a clear historical 
 
 117. It also gives the House a say in the use of recess appointments. Article I provides that 
each house of Congress must agree to the other’s recessing for more than three days—well 
under the ten-day minimum recess period that Noel Canning requires to trigger the President’s 
recess-appointments authority. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (documenting the adjournment 
requirements). Thus, if the House of Representatives refuses to give its consent to a recess of 
the Senate exceeding three days, the Senate may not constitutionally adjourn. Interestingly, in 
the event of an impasse between the House and the Senate regarding a recess, the Constitution 
vests the President with the power to resolve the dispute; the President would presumably take 
the Senate’s side if he wished to make recess appointments. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 
(empowering the President to adjourn Congress in the event of a disagreement). To be clear, 
however, the President does not have any general power to force the Senate into a recess 
against its will. 
 118. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2595–98 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 119. Id. at 2607–08. 
 120. Id. at 2595–2600 (opining that “recess” has a plain meaning and refers only to 
intersession recesses); id. at 2606–10 (opining that “may happen” can refer only to vacancies 
that come into existence during a recess). 
 121. Id. at 2610.  
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practice,”122 but argued that “[w]hat it has is a clear text and an at-
best-ambiguous historical practice.”123 Justice Scalia charged that 
Justice Breyer and the majority had embraced an “adverse-possession 
theory of executive power,”124 an approach that runs a substantial risk 
of “aggrandizing the Presidency beyond its constitutional bounds and 
undermining respect for the separation of powers.”125 
The irony of Justice Scalia’s approach is that it would not, in 
practice, prove any more effective at protecting the Senate’s 
prerogative over presidential appointments than the majority’s 
approach (which essentially gives the Senate an unfettered ability to 
block all recess appointments, including intersession recess 
appointments, by holding sessions in which it could, in theory, 
conduct business at least once every nine days). Unlike Justice Scalia, 
the majority empowers the Senate, if it wishes, to essentially nullify 
the recess-appointments power—but it also permits the Senate to give 
the President leeway to make such appointments (by not holding 
sessions at least every nine days), an outcome that would seem to 
better protect the Senate’s advice-and-consent prerogative than 
Justice Scalia’s approach. The majority’s ten-day rule better 
safeguards against presidential self-help by applying the minimum-
ten-day-recess rule to any and all recesses of the Senate—including 
intersession recesses. 
Moreover, Justice Scalia’s approach to the recess-appointments 
question largely ignores the imperatives of Article II’s Vesting and 
Take Care Clauses (and arguably the Opinions Clause as well).126 The 
 
 122. Id. at 2617. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. Professor Turley first coined this characterization of President Obama’s attempted 
use of the recess-appointments power. See Turley, supra note 26, at 971–72, 975 (describing the 
President’s attempted use of the recess-appointments power to bypass the Senate, and rejecting 
“the claim that somehow the Executive Branch has acquired title to a power of Congress by 
adversely occupying the area of recess appointments”); see also id. at 1030–34 (discussing and 
comparing the President’s “adverse possession” of the recess-appointments power with the 
common law property doctrine). Even so, Justice Scalia did not cite Turley’s work in his Noel 
Canning opinion. 
 125. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2618. For a highly persuasive rejoinder to Justice Scalia’s 
adverse possession argument, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil A. Siegel, After Recess: Historical 
Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 42–45), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2547962.  
 126. In fairness to Justice Scalia, he does suggest that the use of acting appointments could 
be used to ensure presidential control of federal administrative agencies. See Noel Canning, 134 
S. Ct. at 2609–10 (describing the president’s authority to appoint “acting” officers to fill 
vacancies). But such appointments will not work for independent federal agencies, such as the 
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plain text of Article II presupposes that the President will be able to 
call on subordinate executive officers—“Heads of Departments.”127 
Yet, if the Senate refuses to confirm any appointees to these offices, 
the executive power cannot really be said to be vested in the 
President—Congress has encroached on this authority, and essentially 
dissipated the executive power, by preventing the President from 
staffing principal offices within the executive branch.128 Other directly 
vested powers, such as control over the military forces129 and foreign 
relations,130 also require subordinate officers within the executive 
branch who are loyal and accountable to the President. 
Justice Scalia simply does not address the critical relationship of 
appointments to the exercise of these specifically delegated 
presidential powers. Thus, the dissent largely misses the forest—
namely, the Framers’ structural design, which requires the President 
to ensure enforcement of federal law and to conduct the nation’s 
diplomatic and military affairs.131 It instead focuses on a single tree—
the Recess Appointments Clause and the general requirement that 
 
NLRB, that feature collective agency heads. A staff member at the NLRB, or even members 
comprising less than a quorum, may not legally act on behalf of the agency. See New Process 
Steel, L.P. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 560 U.S. 674, 687–88 (2010) (discussing and strictly 
enforcing the Board’s quorum requirements). Such officers also lack the imprimatur of a 
presidential appointment and the Senate’s advice and consent; these facts could weaken their 
efficacy. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 981–84 (2009) (discussing the importance of political accountability, 
political legitimacy, and expertise in high-ranking executive officers, and noting that although 
acting officers often possess expertise, they usually lack the other attributes). 
 127. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 324–27 (2012) 
(discussing the meaning and importance of the Opinions Clause). Amar argues that the 
Opinions Clause serves to help secure responsibility and accountability for the executive branch 
by preventing the President from disclaiming personal responsibility for the actions of his 
subordinates; as Amar states the proposition, “the buck stops with him.” Id. at 327. 
 128. See AMAR, supra note 127, at 327 (positing that the “big idea behind the opinions 
clause” relates to presidential accountability—namely, that “a president could never claim that 
his hands were tied because he had been outvoted or overridden by his advisers in a secret 
conference”). 
 129. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that “[t]he President shall be Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States”). 
 130. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President “shall have Power, by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, . . . and he shall nominate, 
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls”). 
 131. See J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162, 1183–
94 (1989) (discussing the Constitution’s imposition of “mandatory” presidential duties, and 
arguing that the Constitution requires the President to perform them, even if Congress elects 
not to provide appropriations to fund the President’s constitutional obligations). 
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the Senate consent to presidential appointments of executive-branch 
officers and federal judges.132 
To be sure, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion does not mine 
Article II as much as it could—beyond a passing reference to 
presidential control and oversight, the majority opinion does not fully 
engage the scope of the conflict between the Senate’s advice-and-
consent power and specific provisions of Article II.133 Nevertheless, a 
plausible textualist opinion must, at a minimum, seek to engage all 
the relevant constitutional text. This, however, Justice Scalia did not 
do. 
Moreover, Justice Scalia’s account of the absolute veto power 
the Senate should hold over presidential appointments is 
fundamentally inconsistent with his important and iconic defense of 
the unitary executive in other contexts. Over time, Justice Scalia has 
been a principal advocate of the unitary executive theory and of the 
absolute necessity of ensuring that the president may personally 
oversee and direct all operations of the executive branch.134 Thus, it 
seems odd for Justice Scalia to say that Congress may not limit 
presidential oversight of an independent counsel,135 but may force an 
entire shutdown of the Department of Justice by refusing to confirm 
any principal or inferior officers to staff it. 
Principled formalism requires a reviewing court to consult all 
relevant constitutional text. One must also carefully consider all of 
the relevant structural implications of the Framers’ design for each of 
the three coordinate branches of the federal government. A close 
reading of the Appointments and Recess Appointments Clauses, 
shorn of any effort to integrate these provisions within the larger 
 
 132. Ironically, even as Justice Scalia decried the majority’s substantial reliance on 
conventions developed over time to inform the meaning and scope of the Recess Appointments 
Clause, he himself relied on these very same materials to support his claim that the Clause has a 
plain meaning with respect to both intrasession recess appointments and the use of recess 
appointments to fill vacancies that come into being during a session of the Senate. See Nat’l 
Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2596 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 
early opinions of the attorney general); id. at 2607–09 (invoking the early practice of presidents 
to support limiting recess appointments to offices that become vacant while the Senate is in an 
intersession recess). Practice is either relevant, or it is not; so too, the constitutional text is either 
unambiguous on its face, or it is not. Justice Scalia’s objection, then, seems to boil down to one 
of scope rather than kind. 
 133. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567–70. 
 134. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705–09 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 135. See id. at 705 (arguing that the Vesting Clause of Article II, Section 1, creates a unitary 
Executive who holds the entire executive power, and that “this does not mean some of the 
executive power, but all of the executive power”). 
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constitutional framework, is simply not good formalist analysis—
indeed, it is not even good textualist analysis, for a close reading of 
the text ought to require a close reading of all the relevant text. 
Justice Scalia’s opinion largely abandons his longstanding 
commitment to the textual and structural imperatives of Article II—
an odd result that might lead a skeptical observer to question whether 
his more general commitment to a unitary executive extends to the 
current occupant of the Oval Office.136 
More broadly, given that any reading of the Recess 
Appointments Clause will inevitably leave both branches in 
possession of plausible workaround devices, one also has to wonder 
whether the whole game was worth the candle. Given that both 
solutions leave the door open to clever shenanigans that honor the 
text, but not the spirit, of the Recess Appointments Clause, it seems 
plausible to ask whether the Justices should have simply left this 
problem to the political branches to work out for themselves.137 
D. Squaring the Circle: Is Noel Canning a Formalist or  
Functionalist Decision? 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion does not rest on a truly 
functionalist analysis. To be sure, thoroughly functionalist approaches 
to framing the Recess Appointments Clause not only existed, but also 
found eager advocates within the scholarly community. If one views 
the appointments process as “broken” and in need of “fixing,” very 
broad forms of presidential self-help become desirable. Professor 
Matthew Stephenson, for example, has posited that the Senate’s 
failure to vote on a presidential nomination within a reasonable 
period of time should be construed as a form of constructive 
 
 136. See also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521–22 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing President Obama for failing to adequately enforce the nation’s immigration laws). 
 137. See Huq, supra note 17, at 5–8. Of course, one of the virtues of Justice Breyer’s opinion 
is that, although it does not reduce the Appointments Clause to a nullity, it leaves both branches 
well armed to continue to engage in partisan conflict over appointments. It did not give the 
President what he sought and what some legal academics advocated—the ability to make recess 
appointments whenever a recess exists and without regard to whether the Senate is available to 
receive and consider appointments. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 30, at 726–27, 750–52. As 
Bryan Leitch observes, “Were the president able to trump the Senate’s own determination of 
when it is or is not in recess, there is no principled reason for prohibiting the president from 
independently deciding, for example, whether the Senate has given its advice and consent under 
the Appointments Clause.” Leitch, supra note 70, at 252. 
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consent.138 Professor Stephenson, citing “[e]xcessive Senate 
obstructionism,”139 argues that the Senate’s silence (that is, its failure 
to vote on a pending nomination) should be construed as its de facto 
consent (at least for senior posts within the executive branch).140 Thus, 
“the ordinary meaning of the term, as well as its usage in law and 
legislative practice, establishes that the text of Article II, Section 2 
does not provide any prima facie reason to conclude that an 
affirmative Senate confirmation vote is always necessary.”141 
Professor Stephenson’s proposal, of course, essentially reads the 
consent requirement out of Article II, Section 2. It also ignores over 
225 years of settled practice between the President and the Senate.142 
But from a truly functionalist perspective, the Senate’s ability to 
impede—and perhaps cripple143—the operation of a federal 
administrative agency justifies broader and stronger forms of 
presidential self-help. Other legal academics, including Professors 
Peter Shane and John Roberts, have also argued that if the Senate 
will not reliably vote on the President’s nominees, the President 
should be able to install them without the Senate’s consent.144  
The standard route to this result is not by treating inaction as 
consent (as Professor Stephenson proposes), but rather by torturing 
the Recess Appointments Clause to permit the President to recess-
appoint executive officers when the Senate takes a lunch break. If the 
 
 138. See Stephenson, supra note 39, at 950–51 (arguing that “consent can be understood 
either as requiring some affirmative, express act or declaration, or as something that can be 
given tacitly, through inaction or failure to object, depending on context”). 
 139. Id. at 944. 
 140. See id. at 951–53 (positing that “tacit consent” should be deemed to satisfy the 
imperatives of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, and noting that “[i]ndeed, a hoary English 
common law maxim, derived from Roman law, asserts that qui tacet consentire videtur (‘one who 
keeps silent is understood to consent’)”). 
 141. Id. at 953. 
 142. Presumably Professor Stephenson would not extend this argument to judicial 
nominations, insofar as he rests his argument on the notion that the President cannot discharge 
his constitutional duties without the assistance of subordinate executive officers. See id. at 953–
58 (arguing that the President’s “take care” duties under Article II permit him to treat Senate 
inaction on executive-branch nominations as “tacit consent” to such nominations). Oddly, 
however, Stephenson excludes judicial appointments from his theory of implied senatorial 
consent for “primarily pragmatic” reasons related to their life tenure. See id. at 973–74 
(explaining this exception); see also id. at 974 (“Article III judges, though appointed by the 
President, perform a different constitutional function, and the Take Care Clause has little 
bearing on how one should interpret the process for judicial appointments.”). 
 143. The President’s options for securing meaningful control over independent agencies are 
far more limited than with respect to presidentially controlled departments. See supra note 126. 
 144. See infra notes 173–85 and accompanying text. 
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President alone may determine when the Senate is in “recess,” then 
no good reason exists to take the more radical step that Professor 
Stephenson advocates. Moreover, the Constitution does not prohibit 
successive recess appointments for the same person, holding the same 
office; accordingly, the President could simply use successive recess 
appointments, implemented whenever the Senate adjourns, to nullify 
the clear constitutional command that the Senate agree to the 
appointment of principal officers serving within the executive branch. 
By contrast, Justice Breyer’s Noel Canning majority opinion is 
strongly rooted in the text of the Constitution; only when the text was 
ambiguous did he look to conventions established over time.145 His 
opinion reflects a pragmatic form of formalist analysis;146 the decision 
is simply too tightly tethered to the Constitution’s text—and to 
enforcing the text as written147—to pass muster as a functionalist 
exercise. It also leaves open the real possibility of the Senate blocking 
recess appointments by remaining available to receive and consider 
nominations at least one out of every ten days. A functionalist 
approach would attempt to find a more balanced point of equilibrium 
between Congress and the President. 
By way of contrast, Justice Scalia’s nominally concurring opinion 
relies almost exclusively on a kind of originalist–textualist approach 
to render the Recess Appointments Clause largely irrelevant to the 
staffing of the executive branch. Even more than Justice Breyer’s 
opinion, then, Justice Scalia’s approach is strikingly formalist in both 
tone and result. 
 
 145. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561–62 (2014) 
(observing that “[t]he constitutional text is thus ambiguous,” and consulting historical practice 
to resolve this ambiguity); id. at 2567–70 (discerning ambiguity in the phrase “that may 
happen,” and consulting historical practice to resolve this ambiguity); cf. id. at 2574 (holding 
that “the Constitution explicitly empowers the Senate to ‘determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings’”). As Professors Bradley and Siegel cogently observe, “Noel Canning exemplifies 
how the constitutional text, perceptions about clarity or ambiguity, and ‘extra-textual’ 
considerations such as historical practice operate interactively rather than as separate elements 
of interpretation.” Bradley & Siegel, supra note 125, at 55. 
 146. Martin H. Redish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Authority, and the Scope of Article III: 
The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 314–15 (1990) 
(describing and advocating a pragmatic formalist approach to separation-of-powers questions, 
and noting that such analysis includes “elements of common sense”). 
 147. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2573–77 (holding that Article I, Section 5, Clause 2, 
vests the Senate with the power to adopt and enforce its own rules of procedure, including 
decisions related to how to conduct its own sessions, and accordingly, that the Senate’s own 
view of when it is in session should normally be controlling). 
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Thus, both Noel Canning opinions are properly characterized as 
formalist in character. An important distinction nonetheless exists: 
Justice Breyer embraces a pragmatic approach to formalist analysis, 
whereas Justice Scalia does not. 
III.  CONSIDERING THE PREDICTABLE FAILURES OF BOTH 
FORMALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM 
Neither formalism nor functionalism, strictly applied, will 
provide reliable answers to difficult separation-of-powers questions. 
In circumstances where the Constitution provides conflicting textual 
mandates, formalism—particularly its strictest, originalist–textualist 
variety—does not work. Strict formalism presupposes that the text 
invariably offers clear answers, despite the fact that this is not always 
so. On the other hand, functionalism tends to undervalue the 
importance of text when the Constitution does offer clear rules of the 
road.148 This Part considers how both traditional modes of separation-
of-powers analysis routinely fail to yield workable solutions to 
difficult separation-of-powers problems. 
Formalism, in its strictest form, reduces to a variation of 
textualism.149 A more moderate approach to formalist separation-of-
powers analysis places some reliance on legislative-history materials 
to clarify or resolve ambiguities that a reviewing court finds in the 
Constitution’s text.150 But under this approach, legislative-history 
materials are relevant only to ascertaining the “public meaning” of 
the relevant text and only insofar as they “might shed light on the 
original meaning the constitutional text had to those who wrote it into 
law.”151 Both last and least, a reviewing court may consider historical 
practice, but “[s]uch history is the least reliable source for recovering 
the original meaning of the law.”152 
 
 148. See infra notes 161–87 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were To Govern”: The Need for 
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 453–54, 495–96 (1991) 
(characterizing originalist–textualist formalism as “epistemologically naïve” and “plagued by 
the difficulties that plague originalism,” including “the many variations in opinions among the 
Framers and the difficulty of extrapolating how the Framers would approach unforeseen 
problems or take into account modern developments”); see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra 
note 55, at 551 (arguing that “the text of the Constitution, as originally understood by the 
people who ratified it, is the fundamental law of the land”). 
 150. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 55, at 552–53 (describing a “methodology of 
originalism that sets out a hierarchy of originalist source materials”). 
 151. Id. at 553. 
 152. Id. 
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Formalist analysis works quite well with respect to some 
questions. For example, Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, expressly 
requires a bill to be passed in both houses of Congress and presented 
to the President “before it become a Law.”153 One need not consult 
legislative history, materials from the Federal Convention, or 
historical practice in order to ascertain this provision’s meaning and 
effect—much less contemporary dictionaries from the time of the 
framing.154 Other provisions of the Constitution, such as the 
minimum-age requirements for service in the House or Senate,155 are 
equally easy to understand and do not require any interpretative 
gymnastics.156 
These differences in specificity ought to play a significant role in 
separation-of-powers doctrine. For example, Professor Manning 
argues that the federal courts should strictly enforce specific 
constitutional clauses that establish procedural requirements or vest 
particular powers with a specific branch.157 On the other hand, when a 
clause “is indeterminate—as the Vesting Clauses often (but not 
always) are—interpreters have no basis to displace judgments made 
by Congress pursuant to the express power delegated to it to compose 
the government under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”158 Of 
 
 153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 154. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957–59 (1983). 
 155. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring that all members of the House be at least 
twenty-five years old); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (requiring that all members of the Senate be 
at least thirty years old). 
 156. But cf. JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE 
AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 180 (2007) 
(discussing the interesting case of Senator Rush Holt, who was elected to the Senate some seven 
months before his thirtieth birthday and nevertheless was seated because he waited until after 
his birthday to present his credentials to the Senate); RICHARD D. HUPMAN, SENATE 
ELECTION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE CASES FROM 1789 TO 1960, at 135 (1962) (same). Thus, 
even constitutional text that most people agree has a single, clear, and fixed meaning can give 
rise to interpretive difficulties. In some respects, this is probably an unavoidable aspect of 
language itself. See STANLEY E. FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 2–8, 12–14, 42–59 
(1980) (arguing that words have meaning only within the context of a particular interpretive 
community that agrees to give particular words and phrases a particular significance); STANLEY 
FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING TOO 182–86 (1994) 
(arguing that all legal texts are susceptible of multiple interpretations, positing that “one can 
always find meanings in a text other than the ones intended by the author,” and arguing that 
“since looking for evidence of intention is what every interpreter does, knowing that one is 
doing it is no methodological advantage”). In fact, Fish asserts that “[f]ormalist literalist or ‘four 
corners’ interpretation is not inadvisable . . . it is impossible.” Id. at 208. 
 157. Manning, supra note 5, at 1945–49, 2039–40. 
 158. Id. at 2040. 
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course, “No interpretive method . . . is complication free.”159 The most 
obvious complication with Manning’s principled formalism is that, to 
use Manning’s own words, “the particular ways in which 
constitutionmakers blended power . . . do not constitute a coherent 
listing or grouping.”160 
Any textualist approach to enforcing the separation-of-powers 
doctrine will fall short when the text itself allocates powers on a 
shared, or blended, basis (as is the case with both the appointments 
process and the war powers161). Yet, a principled form of 
constitutional originalism162 must frankly acknowledge that the 
Framers intentionally introduced ambiguity into the document—and 
did so without specifying how to disentangle conflicting and shared 
powers.163 As Professor David Robertson observes, “the Constitution 
created an ingenious national government of separated institutions 
sharing powers”164—that is, “a government of separate institutions, 
each with the will and ability to defend its independence.”165 
I do not suggest that formalism never provides clear guidance, 
but it does not invariably provide clear guidance. In light of this fact, 
a sensible person sympathetic to formalism’s first-order concerns 
should embrace a pragmatic variant of the doctrine.166 In this context, 
pragmatism means straightforwardly acknowledging that the 
Constitution’s text does not provide clear answers to all questions 
regarding the power and authority of each branch, even though it 
does make some mandatory allocations of powers among the three 
branches. 
Professor Martin Redish and Elizabeth Cisar have advocated 
“pragmatic formalism,” by which they mean a variant of formalism 
that “is a ‘street-smart’ mode of interpretation, growing out of a 
recognition of the dangers . . . which a more ‘functional’ or ‘balancing’ 
 
 159. Id. at 2039. 
 160. Id. at 2015. 
 161. See supra note 14. 
 162. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 55, at 551–52, 558–59. 
 163. See ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 235–36 (noting that “[t]he Framers’ Constitution 
was deliberately unfinished, an incomplete framework for the future play of republican politics” 
and that “the people’s conventions ratified the Constitution with all these ambiguities in 
place”). 
 164. Id. at 233. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See generally Redish & Cisar, supra note 149, at 453–56, 474–78 (advocating a 
“pragmatic formalist” approach to enforcing the separation-of-powers doctrine). 
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analysis in the separation of powers context may create.”167 Pragmatic 
formalism “recognizes that once a reviewing court begins down those 
[functionalist] roads in the enforcement of separation of powers, no 
meaningful limitations on interbranch usurpation of power remain.”168 
Accordingly, Redish and Cisar reject a strictly textualist approach to 
formalism because it “represents a commitment to a rigidity and level 
of abstraction that is quite probably not possible, and that is certainly 
unwise.”169 Importantly, their “pragmatic brand of formalism, 
however, grows not out of a rejection of an inquiry into the social and 
political purposes that underlie text, but out of a careful search for 
them.”170 
The alternative advanced by proponents of highly textualist 
formalism—interpretation by dictionary—does not seem either 
principled or normatively attractive. Consulting a dictionary to 
ascertain the document’s meaning171 does not tell us what the Framers 
actually meant; after all, the Constitution lacks a glossary, and it does 
not declare a particular contemporaneous dictionary as the next-best 
option. Nevertheless, Professors Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna 
Prakash argue that “[l]anguage is a social invention, and thus 
meaningless without access to those external sources, such as 
dictionaries, that explain the rules as to how a particular language is 
used.”172 This approach offers only a false hope of avoiding the need 
for judges to exercise discretion in interpreting and applying the 
Constitution. When a constitutional conflict exists, a dictionary 
provides a very poor basis for interpreting and applying the 
Constitution when lived experience has important lessons to teach. 
 
 167. Id. at 454. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. Redish and Cisar emphasize that “our version of formalism also rejects use of an 
originalist perspective, sometimes thought to be an inherent element of formalism in general.” 
Id. at 454 n.23. They expressly reject the use of originalist textualism as a primary means of 
enforcing their vision of pragmatic formalism. See id. at 494–97; cf. Calabresi & Prakash, supra 
note 55, at 550–58 (advocating a strictly originalist-textualist approach to enforcing separation-
of-powers doctrine). 
 170. Redish & Cisar, supra note 149, at 505. For a more complete overview of Redish and 
Cisar’s iteration of pragmatic formalism, a topic that lies beyond the scope of this Article, see id. 
at 474–90. 
 171. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 55, at 552 n.35; see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING 
OF AMERICA 144–45 (1990) (advocating the use of “dictionaries in use at the time” of the 
framing, as well as other contemporaneous materials, to ascertain the Constitution’s meaning). 
 172. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 55, at 552 n.35. 
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On the other hand, it is remarkable that serious legal academics 
would suggest that the President may construe the Senate’s inaction 
on a nomination as constituting its de facto consent to it. And yet, 
Professor Stephenson suggests that 
when the President nominates an individual to a principal office in 
the executive branch, where filling that office is essential for the 
President to fulfill his or her duty faithfully to execute the laws, the 
Senate’s failure to act on the nomination within a reasonable period 
of time, despite good faith efforts of the nominee’s supporters to 
secure a floor vote, shall be construed as providing the Senate’s tacit 
or implied “Advice and Consent” to the appointment within the 
meaning of the Appointments Clause.173 
In case there is any doubt about his meaning, he helpfully adds that 
“[t]he argument, in other words, is that the appointment of certain 
senior executive officers does not require a Senate confirmation vote 
as a matter of constitutional law.”174 
Stephenson’s argument represents functionalism running amok. 
In light of the unambiguous text of the Appointments Clause, in 
tandem with over 225 years of consistent practice—regardless of the 
party controlling the White House or the Senate—this kind of “ends 
justify the means” reasoning simply won’t wash.175 Constitutional law 
and interpretation do not constitute simply another species of 
politics.176 
In fairness to Professor Stephenson, he correctly, and reasonably, 
invokes the Take Care Clause and the structural imperatives of the 
unitary executive to justify his otherwise radical proposal.177 But his 
solution—construing a failure to act as the equivalent of the Senate’s 
 
 173. Stephenson, supra note 39, at 946. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 431 (observing that “interested parties are 
more likely to find ambiguity when their political needs demand it, and in such cases arguments 
from historical practice are more likely to feature prominently”). 
 176. See ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 26, 68, 258–59, 375–76 
(1987) (arguing that the legitimacy of constitutional review rests on the “fragile faith” that 
constitutional law and politics are separate enterprises); see also Herbert Wechsler, Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (arguing that “the main 
constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with 
respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite 
transcending the immediate result that is achieved”). But cf. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, 
at 431–32 (positing that “constitutional law and politics are intertwined” in controversies 
involving interbranch disputes implicating the separation of powers). 
 177. See Stephenson, supra note 39, at 947–49, 953–57. 
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affirmative consent to senior executive nominations—is “to burn the 
house to roast the pig.”178 Other forms of presidential self-help, such 
as designating “czars,” holding presidential staff appointments in the 
West Wing, and vesting them with oversight of acting officers within 
the various departments, would constitute a less radical approach179—
and one that does not do violence to the plain meaning of the 
Constitution’s text.180 
It also bears noting that Professor Stephenson is hardly alone in 
advocating strong forms of presidential self-help in staffing the 
executive branch. Professor Roberts argues that the President should 
be permitted to determine for himself whether the Senate is available 
to receive and consider nominations; if he deems that it is not, 
Roberts argues, the President should enjoy a free hand to use the 
Recess Appointments Clause to fill vacancies.181 Roberts contends 
that 
[t]he crux of the President’s argument, therefore, is that while the 
Senate could constitutionally preclude any recess appointments by 
actually remaining in session throughout the year—in the sense that 
a quorum is present and official business is conducted—it may not 
block the President’s power by pretending to be in session when it is 
not. The argument seems compelling. If pro forma sessions were 
valid to block recess appointments during what would otherwise be 
a recess, then the President’s power to make recess appointments 
even during months-long recesses would be negated, surely 
disrupting the balance established by the Appointments Clause.182 
This argument largely corresponds to the arguments advanced by 
OLC in support of the President’s position that he could simply 
disregard the Senate’s pro forma sessions.183 
 
 178. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (“The State insists that, by thus 
quarantining the general reading public against books not too rugged for grown men and 
women in order to shield juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general 
welfare. Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig.”). 
 179. See Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White 
House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2583–95 (2011) (discussing the use of White House-
based “czars” to superintend policymaking in both cabinet and independent federal agencies). 
 180. See generally id. at 2603–09 (discussing and analyzing the constitutional status of 
domestic policy czars, with particular attention to the separation-of-powers issues that such 
appointments present).  
 181. Roberts, supra note 30, at 749–52. 
 182. Id. at 749. 
 183. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
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Professor Peter Shane has offered multiple functionalist 
arguments in favor of permitting the President to bypass the Senate’s 
advice-and-consent prerogative to staff positions within the executive 
branch.184 He suggests that, at a minimum, the federal courts should 
decline to intervene if the President engages in self-help by holding 
that the dispute presents a nonjusticiable political question.185 Even 
Shane and Roberts, however, do not suggest that the President should 
be permitted to construe Senate inaction as de facto consent to a 
nomination. 
These theories all demonstrate quite clearly the significant 
shortcomings of functionalism in addressing problems associated with 
blended powers. That methodology does not offer any clear 
guideposts and leaves federal judges vulnerable to the accusation that 
they are simply pursuing their own ideological or, worse yet, political 
preferences.186 Functionalism, at least in this context, does not offer an 
objective basis to justify any particular merits outcome.187 
Someone more sympathetic to the Senate’s institutional 
prerogatives, and particularly to the Senate opposition caucus, could 
just as easily argue that because Congress created federal executive 
offices, it has the power to abolish them. Failing to confirm 
nominations is simply one way of exercising congressional power to 
abolish an office on a temporary basis. Accordingly, the argument 
would go, the President may not engage in self-help to execute 
federal laws, such as relying on White House staff (not subject to 
senatorial confirmation) or designating acting officers within the 
various cabinet departments. These outcomes are no more 
principled—or related to constitutional text, history, and practice—
than the approaches advocated by Professors Stephenson, Roberts, 
and Shane. Overlapping powers require courts to take careful account 
 
 184. Peter M. Shane, Noel Canning v. NLRB: Should Courts Police the Recess Appointments 
Power?, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 195, 202, 207–09 (2013). 
 185. Id. at 207–09; see also Peter M. Shane, The Future of Recess Appointments in Light of 
Noel Canning v. NLRB, BLOOMBERG LAW (May 14, 2013), http://www.bna.com/the-future-of-
recess-appointments-in-light-of-noel-canning-v-nlrb (arguing that the Supreme Court should 
sustain the President’s contested recess appointments or deem the dispute a nonjusticiable 
political question); Peter M. Shane, NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation: Third 
Circuit Further Fuels the Constitutional Conflict over Recess Appointments, BLOOMBERG BNA 
DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (May 24, 2013) (arguing that “unanticipated circumstances” 
justify new forms of presidential self-help in filling vacancies). 
 186. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 149, at 490–91. 
 187. See id. at 476–77, 491 (arguing that functionalism does not provide “any 
comprehensible standard by which to guide particular incursions on the separation of powers”). 
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of text, history, and practice to arrive at sensible results. And 
reviewing courts should take care not to do more harm than good 
through their interventions in these highly contested disputes 
between the political branches. 
At bottom, functionalism essentially collapses constitutional law 
and politics—and in favor of politics. To be sure, there is more than a 
little truth to the intuition that judges are hardly apolitical 
handmaidens of the law.188 But the federal courts should be wary of 
publicly embracing this intuition if they wish to retain the confidence 
and support of the American people. If judges become just another 
set of politicians in black robes, the theoretical basis for judicial 
review more or less evaporates.189 
Cases presenting constitutional conflicts, in light of blended or 
shared allocations of power within the Constitution itself, present the 
greatest risk of judges appearing to act as political agents rather than 
honest brokers. Accordingly, just as a strictly formalist legal analysis 
cannot generate useful answers in cases involving constitutional 
conflicts,190 neither can a strictly functionalist analysis. In such cases, 
courts must deploy the full menu of accepted interpretive techniques. 
This toolkit certainly includes text, legislative history, and historical 
practice. It also includes broader public-policy concerns, changes in 
background facts over time, and the larger purposes that undergird 
specific constitutional text. All of these interpretive devices enjoy 
broad-based acceptance and legitimacy. Moreover, consistent practice 
over time—in the form of constitutional conventions—presents the 
most promising and objective interpretive device for resolving 
conflicts that are simply part of the Constitution’s original design. 
 
 188. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for Neutral Principles in Constitutional 
Law: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging Jurisprudence of Oprah!, 90 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2093–97 
(2002) (discussing the political undertones of the Justices’ opinions in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000)). 
 189. See id. at 2097–2101 (discussing the importance of principled constitutional 
decisionmaking to judicial legitimacy, and positing that “if federal judges are simply another set 
of partisan actors, it is difficult to see why their decisions should not be popularly accountable”). 
 190. In such cases, the Constitution mandates diametrically opposed outcomes and does not 
provide a textual basis for privileging one clause at the expense of another. See supra notes 24–
47 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  HISTORICAL PRACTICE AS A MEANS OF REFRAMING 
SEPARATION-OF-POWERS ANALYSIS 
When the Constitution provides conflicting rules of decision, as 
is arguably the case in the context of the Appointments and Take 
Care Clauses,191 three questions necessarily follow. First, should 
federal courts resolve the conflict or leave it to the political branches 
to work out between themselves? Second, and assuming that such 
disputes should be viewed as justiciable, what methodology should a 
reviewing court use to resolve conflicting constitutional commands? 
Third, and finally, what general principles should courts follow in 
such circumstances? This Part considers each of these questions and 
concludes that such disputes should be deemed justiciable, that the 
federal courts should rely on historical practice to inform their 
analysis of how to resolve constitutional conflicts, and that the federal 
courts should choose the “least unconstitutional”192 path as they 
attempt to resolve constitutional conflicts. 
A. The Duty To Decide: Why Courts Should Reach the Merits in 
Interbranch Disputes Between Congress and the President 
Professors Aziz Huq and Peter Shane have separately argued 
that the federal courts should not resolve separation-of-powers 
disputes between the President and Congress.193 Professor Huq, 
writing in the context of presidential removal of executive officers 
insulated by for-cause protection, posits that the federal courts should 
treat such removals as nonjusticiable political questions because of an 
absence of judicially manageable standards for evaluating such 
claims.194 He observes that “[r]endering removal nonjusticiable leaves 
the underlying constitutional question to be resolved through 
contestation between democratically credentialed actors.”195 Huq 
 
 191. See Stephenson, supra note 39, at 950–58. 
 192. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How To Choose the Least Unconstitutional 
Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1175, 1175 (2012). 
 193. See Huq, supra note 17, at 6–9; Shane, supra note 184, at 207–08; Peter M. Shane, In 
NLRB Recess Appointments Case, Roberts Court Can Now Show It Knows How To Exercise 
Judicial Restraint, 27 LAB. REL. WK. 1533, Aug. 7, 2013. 
 194. Huq, supra note 17, at 22–24. 
 195. Id. at 73. 
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argues that abstention on political-question grounds “is not to award 
the laurel to either Congress or the White House.”196 
Professor Shane, writing in the context of the President’s 
appointments power, advances very similar arguments. He argues 
that the Supreme Court should have treated the dispute in Noel 
Canning as presenting a nonjusticiable political question197—one “that 
the Court regards as constitutionally left to the elected branches of 
government to decide for themselves.”198 He posits that “[w]here the 
Constitution assigns to the elected branches a shared power, as with 
treaties or appointments, the Court behaves wisely in allowing each 
branch’s political and institutional incentives and disincentives to 
operate, as they were intended, to curb overreach by the other 
branch.”199 
Of course, the Court did not heed this advice—both Justice 
Breyer and Justice Scalia offered extensive opinions on all three 
merits questions presented for decision.200 But the fact that both the 
majority and dissenting blocs reached the merits in Noel Canning 
does not answer the harder question of whether they should have 
done so. In my view, judicial abstention from interbranch disputes is 
not a passive virtue,201 but rather an active vice.202 
Justice Lewis Powell authored one of the most thoughtful, and 
influential, glosses on when the Supreme Court should agree to 
referee interbranch disputes between the President and Congress. In 
his iconic concurring opinion in Goldwater v. Carter,203 he posited that 
“[i]nterpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of respect 
 
 196. Id.; see id. at 75 (“The net effect of nonjusticiability, in short, is to leave in place 
whatever statutory framework Congress and the President have already converged upon, while 
effectuating little change to the de facto doctrinal status quo.”). 
 197. Shane, supra note 184, at 207–09. 
 198. Id. at 208. 
 199. Id. at 209. 
 200. See supra notes 82–137 and accompanying text. 
 201. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 49–50, 74–79 (arguing that the federal courts sometimes 
act wisely in declining to reach the merits of disputes at the first available opportunity). 
 202. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and 
Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 46–48 (1998) (discussing the “active vices of the passive virtues” 
and the reasons why judges should consider engaging in a dialectic with Congress about 
constitutional values); see also Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A 
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (1964) 
(describing and discussing the potential pitfalls of undue judicial caution in the enforcement of 
constitutional rights). 
 203. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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for a coordinate branch.”204 Consistent with this view, Justice Powell 
argued that when the President and Congress reach “irreconcilable 
positions” on a question regarding the proper scope of each branch’s 
respective constitutional authority, the Supreme Court has a duty 
under Marbury v. Madison205 to “say what the law is.”206 Undertaking 
this responsibility constitutes a core judicial duty that Article III 
judges cannot legitimately shirk.207 
Failing to resolve conflicting interbranch claims to constitutional 
authority does not so much indicate respect for the coordinate 
branches of the federal government as it does abdicate a core 
responsibility of the judicial branch. As Justice Powell observed, “If 
the President and the Congress had reached irreconcilable positions, 
final disposition of the question presented by this case would 
eliminate, rather than create, multiple constitutional 
interpretations.”208 Accordingly, refusing to decide the limits and 
scope of the President’s recess-appointments power does not 
constitute judicial statesmanship, but rather judicial abdication. 
B. Historical Practice as a Potential Tiebreaker for Deciding Difficult 
Separation-of-Powers Questions 
When constitutional provisions point in different directions, as 
with the Appointments Clause and the Take Care Clause,209 recourse 
to the Constitution itself will not resolve the ambiguity. In this 
respect, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Noel Canning lacks persuasive 
force because he focuses myopically on the Appointments Clause and 
gives no attention whatsoever to the Take Care Clause (or, for that 
matter, to the Opinions Clause).210 To focus exclusively on the 
 
 204. Id. at 1001. 
 205. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 206. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1000 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
at 177). 
 207. Id. at 1001; see Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427–28 (2012) (“In general, the 
Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even those it ‘would gladly 
avoid.’” (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821))). 
 208. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1001. 
 209. See Stephenson, supra note 39, at 953–55. 
 210. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2617–18 (2014) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (dismissing the majority’s analysis as little more than an endorsement of the so-
called “adverse-possession” theory of the recess-appointments power, and arguing that it “will 
have the effect of aggrandizing the Presidency beyond its constitutional bounds”). But see 
Adrian Vermeule, Recess Appointments and Precautionary Constitutionalism, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 122, 123 (2013) (warning against a “myopic” focus, “even to the point of obsession, on a 
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Senate’s role in giving its advice and consent, to the complete 
exclusion of the textual mandate for the President to enforce federal 
law,211 is to miss the forest for the tree. 
On the other hand, focusing exclusively on the Take Care 
Clause, to the detriment of the Appointments Clause,212 would be no 
less objectionable. Formalism must take seriously all of the textual 
and structural commitments relevant to a particular separation-of-
powers problem. In this context, such an approach would require a 
reviewing court to reconcile the Framers’ clearly stated intention that 
the Senate consent to the President’s appointments to principal 
executive-branch offices with the equally clearly stated intention that 
the President be able to oversee effectively the operation of the 
executive branch (reflected in both the Take Care and Opinions 
Clauses213). Simply put, the text, unaided, will not provide clear 
answers.  
Professor Curtis Bradley and Dean Trevor Morrison have 
advanced a thoughtful and carefully calibrated gloss on how historical 
practice should inform contemporary separation-of-powers 
disputes.214 As they accurately observe, “Arguments based on 
historical practice are a mainstay of debates about the constitutional 
separation of powers.”215 This is so precisely because, in many key 
 
particular target risk, while ignoring countervailing risks, including risks generated by the 
precautions themselves”). Vermeule suggests that “[a]n enlightened decisionmaker will do well 
to consider the systemic, dynamic, and long-run effects of any given precaution, including the 
long-run risk of backlash resulting in perverse outcomes.” Id. at 124. 
 211. It is ironic that Justice Scalia, in another context, has called out President Obama for, in 
his view, failing to enforce federal law with sufficient vigor in the context of federal immigration 
law and policy. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521–22 (2012) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 212. See Roberts, supra note 30, at 733–39; Shane, supra note 184, at 202. 
 213. See AMAR, supra note 127, at 326 (arguing that the “animating spirit of the opinions 
clause” is “to concentrate accountability for presidential action on the president himself”); 
Sidak, supra note 131, at 1164 (arguing that “the fundamental principle animating the 
Constitution—the separation of powers—dictates a unitary Executive, and that a unitary 
Executive cannot tolerate congressional encroachments that, under the pretext of guarding the 
public purse, deny the President the funds necessary to perform the duties and exercise the 
prerogatives conferred on him by article II”); id. at 1185–89 (arguing that Congress may not 
constitutionally prevent the President from discharging mandatory duties by refusing to 
appropriate the funds necessary for their execution). Amar argues that “[n]o matter how 
Congress might choose to contour various executive departments and offices beneath the 
president, the president needed to serve as the legal hub of the executive inner circle and the 
apex of the executive pyramid.” AMAR, supra note 127, at 326. 
 214. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 414–17. 
 215. Id. at 412. 
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contexts, the Framers pursued a balance of powers216 rather than a 
true separation of powers. 
Among the factors that Bradley and Morrison identify as 
relevant to using historical gloss to inform separation-of-powers 
doctrine and practice are the reasons historical practice is relevant, 
and the nature, if any, of acquiescence by one branch in another 
branch’s practices (including “whether they reflect interbranch 
agreements or mere waivers”).217 They also suggest that reviewing 
courts should maintain some degree of skepticism about executive-
branch claims of legislative acquiescence (in light of collective-action 
problems that plague Congress). Finally, Bradley and Morrison posit 
that the “institutional context in which the question arises” must be 
taken into account.218 
Accordingly, “The more an interpreter deems nonpractice 
evidence like the text and original understanding to be clear, the less 
likely the interpreter is to credit historical practice that points in a 
different direction—or, put differently, the more widespread and 
deeply entrenched the practice must be in order to change the 
outcome.”219 Conversely, if nonpractice material is “ambiguous or 
indeterminate, the more likely the interpreter is to rely on historical 
practice to inform constitutional meaning.”220 
Along similar lines, Professor Adrian Vermeule has suggested 
that quasi-constitutional rules arise through “conventions”—
 
 216. The British Constitution, too, features a “balance of powers” rather than a full 
separation of powers. See James Hyre, Comment, The United Kingdom’s Declaration of Judicial 
Independence: Creating a Supreme Court To Secure Individual Rights Under the Human Rights 
Act of 1998, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 432–33 (2004); see also ROBERT STEVENS, THE 
ENGLISH JUDGES: THEIR ROLE IN THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 9 (2002) (observing that 
“balance of powers rather than separation of powers was the British choice”). Although the 
U.S. Constitution plainly embraces the concept of separating and dividing government powers 
in order to better secure individual liberty, in some important contexts—for example, the war 
powers—the Framers instead elected to blend, rather than clearly divide, constitutional 
responsibilities. See supra note 14. In these contexts, where the Constitution calls for a balance 
rather than a separation of powers, courts simply cannot avoid engaging in careful analysis and 
balancing to resolve interbranch disputes. Neither formalism nor functionalism, unaided, will 
prove adequate to the task at hand. 
 217. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 414. 
 218. Id. at 415; see Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of 
Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 134 (1984) (arguing that three conditions must be met in 
order for a consistent practice to become a binding constitutional convention—namely, that the 
custom “must consist of acts,” the branch affected must have been aware of the practice, and 
“the branch placed on notice must have acquiesced in the custom”). 
 219. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 430. 
 220. Id. at 430–31. 
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consistent practices over time.221 Vermeule argues that “[b]etween 
‘politics’ on the one hand and formal written law on the other lies a 
third category of unwritten rules of the game, or conventions.”222 He 
suggests that, at least in theorizing agency independence, “the lens of 
convention is useful . . . in the American administrative state, 
allowing us to make sense of phenomena that from a formal legal 
point of view must remain mysterious.”223 When formal law provides 
conflicting rules of decision, reliance on conventions, established and 
applied over time, presents the best available means of providing an 
objective basis for a reviewing court’s decision, thereby insulating it 
from the potential objection that it reflects simply a judicial, rather 
than constitutional, ordering of values.224 
Other scholars of the administrative process have observed that 
administrative agencies are themselves responsible for creating 
constitutional rules through their practices.225 Professor Gillian 
Metzger, for example, posits that “[i]n practice, administrative 
constitutionalism also encompasses the elaboration of new 
constitutional understandings by administrative actors, as well as the 
construction (or ‘constitution’) of the administrative state through 
structural and substantive measures.”226 She situates her work as part 
of a larger body of legal scholarship that seeks to explain the 
“constitutional role played by ordinary law and the central 
importance to our constitutional system of political efforts to 
construct constitutional meaning.”227 
Metzger’s argument corresponds in important ways with 
Vermeule’s work on conventions—both scholars argue that practices, 
 
 221. See Vermeule, supra note 21, at 1166–68, 1181–86. Vermeule defines conventions as 
“unwritten rules,” id. at 1231, and suggests that conventions are binding even if they are not 
formally judicially enforceable, see id. at 1181–83. 
 222. Id. at 1231. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Cf. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 69–72, 204–96 (discussing the countermajoritarian 
problem of courts invalidating the actions of the politically accountable branches of the federal 
government, and suggesting that the legitimacy of judicial decisions must rest on both the 
appearance and reality of being grounded in constitutional, rather than individual, morality). As 
Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., explained, “it is one thing for a judge to adopt a theory of political 
morality because it is his own; it is another for him to exercise his judgment about what the 
political morality implied by the Constitution is.” Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense of Judicial 
Activism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901, 909 (1979). 
 225. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1897 (2013). 
 226. Id. at 1900. 
 227. Id. at 1902. 
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over time, come to enjoy a kind of quasi-constitutional (if not full 
constitutional) status.228 Thus, Metzger argues that “[s]imilar 
exploitation of the ordinary law–constitutional law overlap could 
occur in other contexts, for example by courts according entrenched 
statutory norms more of a constitutional status.”229 
These arguments, advanced by distinguished administrative-law 
scholars, demonstrate that consistent practice, over time, can come to 
play a role in constraining government—a constraint that, if not 
identical to formal constitutional rules, resembles them in terms of its 
effective binding force. I do not suggest that practice—or 
conventions—should be permitted to override the express 
requirements of the Constitution. For example, it is nonsensical to 
suggest that the President may appoint principal executive officers 
without seeking and obtaining the overt consent of the Senate to each 
and every appointment.230 But in trying to assess how best to reconcile 
the Recess Appointments Clause with the reality that the 
contemporary Senate seems incapable of acting expeditiously on most 
presidential nominations (especially in periods of divided 
government), recourse to the historical dynamics between the Senate 
and the President has much to recommend it.231 
C. On the Virtues of Taking the Least Unconstitutional Path 
The Senate’s inability (or unwillingness) to act on many senior 
presidential appointments presents nontrivial constitutional 
problems.232 The President cannot ensure that the laws are faithfully 
 
 228. See id. at 1903–15. 
 229. Id. at 1902. 
 230. But cf. Stephenson, supra note 39, at 978 (“This Essay has argued that under some 
circumstances, the President should be able to appoint senior executive branch officers without 
a Senate confirmation vote.”). Stephenson explains that “[t]he pragmatic justification for this 
proposal derives from the concern that Senate obstruction of executive branch appointments 
seems to be getting out of hand.” Id. 
 231. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 117 (2005) (discussing the duty of judges to interpret and apply constitutional 
values in ways that ensure the relevancy of moral and political commitments enshrined in the 
document itself, and emphasizing that “[t]he relevant values limit interpretive possibilities”).  
 232. See Roberts, supra note 30, at 727 (arguing that the “long-term struggle between the 
President and the Senate over executive appointments has now reached a crisis and that we may 
be approaching a point where the President’s crucial duty to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed is significantly impaired”); see also Vermeule, supra note 210, at 124 (warning that the 
existence of partisan gridlock on appointments could “produce so much pent-up demand for 
reform of the appointments process that the President offers some radical reinterpretation of 
the Constitution, one that gives him substantially increased discretion over appointments”). 
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executed if he cannot staff offices within the executive branch. Nor 
may the President seek and obtain “Opinions in Writing”233 from 
absent officers. Nevertheless, the very structure of the executive 
branch presupposes that the President will enjoy the assistance of 
subordinates loyal to him and his administration.234 
The work of several prominent administrative-law scholars 
provides helpful insights on how best to navigate the structural 
conflict between the Senate and President over appointments. This 
Part explores how the scholarship of Professors O’Connell, Manning, 
Buchanan, and Dorf could inform answers to these difficult questions. 
Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell persuasively argues that 
“agency vacancies have consequences for the unitary theory of the 
executive and for separation of powers doctrine more generally.”235 If 
the President cannot staff key positions within the administration, the 
unitary executive becomes less unitary; an acting or career officer 
holding a position in a caretaker capacity lacks both political 
legitimacy and political accountability.236 So too, judicial-deference 
doctrines, like Chevron,237 rest on the premise that politically 
accountable agency administrators enjoy greater legitimacy if the 
question presented for decision is really one of policy rather than law; 
whether the same presumption of legitimacy should be afforded to 
the handiwork of an acting official caretaker presents a difficult 
question.238 
Thus, the failure to staff executive-branch offices produces 
constitutional harms—just as would presidential self-help of the sort 
posited by Professor Stephenson. But whether one leaves the 
President minding the store without sufficient subordinates to ensure 
faithful execution of the law or permits the President, by some 
subterfuge, to evade the requirement of obtaining the Senate’s 
consent to the appointment of all principal officers, a constitutional 
harm will occur. A constitutional injury, in these circumstances, 
simply cannot be avoided. 
 
 233. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 234. See O’Connell, supra note 126, at 974–85. 
 235. Id. at 974. 
 236. See id. at 974–80. 
 237. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 
(1984). 
 238. See O’Connell, supra note 126, at 981–84. 
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One could attempt to resolve the conflict by giving the more 
specific constitutional command precedence over the more general 
command; Professor Manning advocates this approach to deciding 
separation-of-powers conflicts.239 He rejects the notion of a 
freestanding separation-of-powers doctrine based on general 
structural features of the Constitution, such as the Vesting Clauses.240 
Still, he cautions that “[t]o say that there is no freestanding separation 
of powers doctrine is not to say that the Constitution contains no 
judicially enforceable separation of powers.”241 
Professor Manning argues that “when the Constitution is 
specific, the Court should read it the way it reads all specific texts,”242 
by which Manning means that a specific constitutional allocation of a 
power or duty cannot simply be reassigned for reasons of convenience 
or efficiency.243 On the other hand, “where no specific clause speaks 
directly to the question at issue, interpreters must respect the 
document’s indeterminacy.”244 Manning posits that separation-of-
powers inquiries should be refocused on “the specific ways in which 
constitutionmakers did, and did not, resolve structural issues in the 
bargained-for constitutional text.”245 
Professor Manning’s general theory—of strictly enforcing 
specific constitutional limits and recognizing substantial congressional 
discretion to adopt novel agency structures in cases where any 
separation-of-powers objection rests largely (if not entirely) on the 
Vesting Clauses246—will work well in circumstances in which a general 
or a specific clause is at issue. It will also work when only a single 
specific clause is at issue—or when a single specific clause is in tension 
with one or more general clauses. However, Manning does not 
address how best to resolve conflicts that implicate not a general and 
a specific clause, but two or more specific clauses. In such a 
 
 239. See Manning, supra note 5, at 1947–49. 
 240. See id. at 1945–48, 1985–86, 1991–93, 2017–21. 
 241. Id. at 1947. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See id. at 1947–48. 
 244. Id. at 1948. 
 245. Id. at 1948–49. 
 246. But see Lawson, supra note 5, at 857–58 (arguing that the federal courts should enforce 
the structural implications of the Vesting Clauses to block reassignment of functions or duties 
among the three branches because “[a]ny exercise of governmental power, and any 
governmental institution exercising that power, must either fit within one of the three formal 
categories thus established [by the Vesting Clauses] or find explicit constitutional authorization 
for such a deviation”). 
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circumstance, one can infer that the general judicial duty to give full 
effect to specific power-allocating clauses would apply, but a conflict 
between such clauses cannot be self-resolving. The questions then 
become whether the courts should resolve such conflicts (or simply 
defer to the President and Congress) and, assuming that they should, 
how best to resolve constitutional conflicts of this sort. 
Courts clearly have a duty to resolve cases that present otherwise 
irreconcilable conflicts between the political branches.247 Accordingly, 
courts must determine how best to reconcile conflicting constitutional 
commands when, on the facts presented, it is impossible to give full 
effect to both. 
Professors Neil Buchanan and Michael Dorf, in the context of 
the debt-ceiling controversy, have argued cogently that the President 
has a duty to take the “least unconstitutional” road when he cannot 
fully discharge all of his constitutional responsibilities.248 By this, they 
mean that when a conflict arises between statutes, it may not be 
possible for the President to implement both fully and effectively—
notwithstanding a general constitutional duty to “take [c]are” that all 
federal laws be given effect.249 As Buchanan and Dorf state the 
paradox, “the president risks acting unconstitutionally no matter what 
he might do, because he will have failed to execute at least one duly 
enacted law of the United States.”250 They also note that, at present, 
“[t]here is virtually no legal doctrine governing the choice among 
unconstitutional options.”251 
In the specific context of the debt-ceiling limit and the 
countervailing duty to pay principal and interest on existing U.S. debt 
instruments, or in cases of a conflict between an annual appropriation 
and the debt ceiling, Buchanan and Dorf argue that ignoring the debt 
ceiling would present the “least unconstitutional” option.252 In 
reaching this conclusion, they offer three general principles that 
should govern the analysis. First, the President should choose the 
option that minimizes his usurpation of power.253 Second, he also 
 
 247. See supra notes 205–08 and accompanying text. 
 248. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 192, at 1181–82, 1218–19, 1243. 
 249. Id. at 1196–97 & n.93. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 1221. 
 252. See id. at 1243. 
 253. Id. at 1222–29. Buchanan and Dorf emphasize that, in undertaking this analysis, “any 
measure of comparative constitutional harm should be qualitative, not quantitative—or at least 
not merely quantitative.” Id. at 1224. 
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should minimize subconstitutional harm.254 Finally, the President 
should choose the option that is easiest to remedy with respect to the 
constitutional violation (or violations) that result.255 
Noel Canning presented facts involving a certain constitutional 
harm—either failing to honor the clear procedural requirements of 
the Appointments Clause or leaving the President incapable of 
enforcing federal laws because of his inability to staff an independent 
agency featuring a collective head. President Obama chose an 
unconstitutional option, by unilaterally deciding for himself that the 
Senate’s pro forma sessions did not count for purposes of applying 
the Recess Appointments Clause. In consequence, the Supreme 
Court disallowed this exercise in presidential self-help and voided the 
President’s contested NLRB appointments.256 
Tellingly, however, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion does not 
resolve the larger constitutional impasse between the President and 
the Senate. To be sure, the Senate may decide for itself whether or 
not it is in session (within very broad parameters).257 But even if the 
Senate may refuse to confirm pending nominations and may also 
block the President from making recess appointments by holding pro 
forma sessions at least every ten days,258 President Obama’s actions 
hardly exhaust the universe of potential presidential responses to 
Senate intransigence on his nominations.259 
Simply put, the full potential scope of presidential self-help in 
staffing and operating the executive branch was not presented in Noel 
Canning. Accordingly, the exact parameters of permissible 
presidential self-help in operating an executive branch plagued by 
vacancies remain to be determined. The President could conceivably 
 
 254. Id. at 1229–39. 
 255. Id. at 1239–43. They also note that “[t]o the extent that a choice among putatively 
unconstitutional options is controversial because of a contest over constitutional meaning, 
political actors ought to strive to ensure that their favored option permits expeditious judicial 
review.” Id. at 1240. 
 256. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2567, 2574–75 (2014). 
 257. Id. at 2574–77. 
 258. Id. at 2567, 2574–77. 
 259. The possibility of frustrating a coordinate branch runs in both directions, of course. If 
the President opposed a law but could not successfully seek its repeal, he could frustrate the 
law’s execution by simply failing to nominate the principal and inferior officers needed to 
execute the authority that Congress delegated to the agency in question. In this way, the 
Constitution’s provisions on nominations reflect not only a check by the Senate on the 
President, but also a check by the President against Congress. Just as the President may not 
decide when the Senate is in session, the Senate may not entertain nominations not offered by 
the President. 
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take steps short of ignoring the Senate’s availability to receive and 
consider nominations that would facilitate faithful execution of the 
laws (and thereby ensure presidential accountability for the 
enforcement of federal law). Moreover, such intermediate steps 
would be more likely to constitute the least unconstitutional option—
and therefore should be preferred over bolder unilateral presidential 
action.260 
Read against the work of Professors Vermeule, O’Connell, 
Buchanan, and Dorf, the Noel Canning majority opinion constitutes a 
masterful solution to a difficult constitutional conflict—and it 
manages not to upset the careful balance of powers that the Framers 
struck in assigning responsibility for appointments between the 
President and the Senate. In so doing, it takes into account the 
practical necessity of the President having sufficient assistance to 
execute his constitutional responsibilities. As Justice Breyer observes, 
the Recess Appointments Clause exists “to permit the President to 
obtain the assistance of subordinate officers when the Senate, due to 
its recess, cannot confirm them.”261 The Constitution mandates 
presidential “control and political accountability” over the executive 
branch.262 At the same time, however, “the Recess Appointments 
Clause is not designed to overcome serious institutional friction,”263 
but rather “simply provides a subsidiary method for appointing 
officials when the Senate is away during a recess.”264 
Moreover, although the Noel Canning majority squarely rejected 
President Obama’s attempt to install principal and inferior officers 
without satisfying the procedural requirements of the Appointments 
Clause, it left the recess-appointments power on the table as a means 
of overcoming entrenched senatorial opposition to the President’s 
nominations—if, but only if, the Senate elects to close up shop for a 
nontrivial period of time. The rules set forth by the Supreme Court 
should also be largely self-enforcing and will not require active and 
ongoing judicial superintendence of the appointments process. 
Faced with a direct constitutional conflict, Justice Breyer 
fashioned the “least unconstitutional” result by integrating the 
imperative of presidential control and oversight over the executive 
 
 260. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 192, at 1181–82, 1218–19, 1239–43. 
 261. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2568. 
 262. Id. at 2569. 
 263. Id. at 2577. 
 264. Id. 
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branch with the concurrent constitutional command that the Senate 
play a meaningful role in overseeing presidential appointments.265 He 
did so because “friction between the branches is an inevitable 
consequence of our constitutional structure.”266 
Justice Breyer’s approach is entirely consistent with the text of 
the Recess Appointments Clause and comports with the larger 
purposes that animated its inclusion in the Constitution. Writing in 
Federalist No. 67, Alexander Hamilton explains: 
The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the President and 
Senate jointly, and can therefore only be exercised during the 
session of the Senate; but as it would have been improper to oblige 
this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers 
and as vacancies might happen in their recess, which it might be 
necessary for the public service to fill without delay, the [Recess 
Appointments Clause] is evidently intended to authorize the 
President, singly, to make temporary appointments “during the 
recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at 
the end of their next session.”267 
It is clear from this passage that the Framers undertook both to 
establish a norm of senatorial approval of presidential appointments 
and to provide an alternative means of appointment that would 
permit the government to function effectively when the Senate, for 
whatever reason, was not available to consider presidential 
nominations. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion fully honors these 
intentions. 
So where does this leave a President who lacks the personnel 
required to discharge his constitutional duties? Professor O’Connell 
notes that presidents have invoked the Take Care Clause as a 
predicate for making emergency appointments free and clear of both 
the Appointments Clause and the Recess Appointments Clause.268 
Professor O’Connell explains that “[e]arly Attorneys General 
consistently argued that the president retained power to make 
temporary appointments outside of the Appointments Clause” and 
that “[t]his power derived, in their view, from the Take Care 
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Clause.”269 Although the Supreme Court has never reached the 
question of the scope of the President’s power to staff positions 
within the executive branch incident to the Take Care Clause, the 
Court must read the Recess Appointments Clause in tandem with this 
overarching, textually specific, presidential obligation.270 
Nevertheless, in the Noel Canning dispute over the contested 
NLRB appointments, the President failed to choose the least 
unconstitutional option in purporting to recess-appoint members to 
the NLRB when the Senate’s recesses were shorter than ten days 
(meaning that the Senate was effectively available to receive and 
consider nominations). Rather than determine for himself what 
constitutes a session of the Senate, President Obama should instead 
have considered using less controversial forms of self-help that did 
not usurp the Senate’s authority under Article I, Section 5, Clause 2. 
For example, the President could have appointed “czars” holding 
staff appointments in the West Wing, perhaps in conjunction with 
reliance on acting officials who could discharge at least some of the 
statutory duties vested in a particular board, bureau, commission, or 
department of the executive branch.271 To be sure, these alternatives 
would not work effectively in all cases, but they would surely work in 
at least some cases. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court would likely sustain such 
presidential self-help practices as constitutional because Article II’s 
specific language creates mandatory duties that the President must 
discharge. Just as the President may not seek to superintend the 
Senate or exercise a power delegated to Congress,272 Congress may 
not seek to usurp the President’s constitutional prerogatives.273 In 
sum, a pragmatic formalist approach must take account of both the 
Senate’s role in the appointments process and also the President’s 
duty to enforce the laws that Congress has enacted.274 
 
 269. Id. at 975. 
 270. See Amar, supra note 34, at 788–95. 
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 272. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (holding that 
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121–22 (1976). 
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to address the ambiguities that inhere in the Constitution’s text). 
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Professor Amar argues that constitutional clauses must be read 
dynamically and conjunctively—synergistically—rather than in 
splendid isolation. He posits that sound constitutional interpretation 
must “always focus[ ] on at least two clauses and highlight[ ] the link 
between them.”275 Amar claims that “[c]lause-bound textualism 
paradigmatically stresses what is explicit in the Constitution’s text,” 
whereas “intratextualism paradigmatically stresses what is only 
implicit in the Constitution’s text.”276 In thinking about the federal 
appointments process, the federal courts have to reconcile conflicting 
constitutional imperatives—the Senate’s voice in the appointments 
process and the President’s concomitant duty to oversee the 
enforcement of federal laws, such that the President is meaningfully 
responsible and politically accountable for his discharge of these 
duties.277 
The Framers designed a presidency whose chief officer was to 
oversee a “vigorous Executive.”278 Writing in Federalist No. 70, 
Alexander Hamilton argues that an energetic chief executive is 
essential to effective governance and that “energy in the executive” 
comprises “unity; duration; an adequate provision for its support; and 
competent powers.”279 The President has a serious constitutional basis 
for demanding that Congress provide the subordinate officers 
necessary for him to perform his constitutional duties.280 But the 
strength of this claim is not sufficient to justify any and all forms of 
presidential self-help. Instead, as Buchanan and Dorf have suggested 
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in a different context,281 the federal courts should require the 
President to choose the “least unconstitutional” form of self-help in 
the face of congressional intransigence on appointments. Usurping 
the power to decide when the Senate is in session, however, is 
emphatically not the least unconstitutional choice.282 
CONCLUSION 
At the end of the day, even if one is generally sympathetic to 
formalist analysis of separation-of-powers questions, formalism’s first 
principles will not always yield clear or consistent results. This is so 
because the Framers not only separated, but also blended, both 
structures and substantive powers. In light of this reality, a 
commitment to a principled—and pragmatic—brand of formalism 
requires careful consideration of historical practice in cases in which 
an exclusively text-based approach will not resolve one of the many 
ambiguities that the Framers deliberately built into the Constitution. 
The federal appointments process provides an excellent illustrative 
example of this problem. 
The Constitution contains conflicting objectives—notably 
including the Senate’s prerogative to play a meaningful role in filling 
federal executive and judicial vacancies alongside a concurrent, 
freestanding commitment to a unitary executive headed by a 
President who enjoys both the power and a duty to enforce all federal 
laws. Accordingly, both simplistic formalist textualism and 
unprincipled “ends justify the means” functionalist proposals to 
permit the President to bypass the Senate should be squarely rejected 
in favor of an analytical approach that uses historical practice to 
inform how best to resolve the conflict embedded in the 
Constitution’s text. 
The Noel Canning majority embraces pragmatic formalism: it 
carefully relies on text, history, practice, and policy to ground its 
resolution of the important separation-of-powers questions presented 
for decision. Moreover, Noel Canning leaves the political branches 
largely free to continue their historical dialectic—the decision 
provides rules of the road going forward, but it does not vest either 
branch with an absolute trump card. In this respect, the majority 
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opinion respects the Framers’ considered decision to balance, rather 
than separate, power in the context of appointments by leaving the 
Constitution’s deliberate ambiguity in place. A pragmatic formalist 
should welcome decisions of this sort, which honor the Framers’ 
intentions far more effectively than blindly enforcing one 
constitutional rule at the direct expense of another. 
 
